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ABSTRACT: 
Governments, although increasingly faced with decision-making on 
matters which involve a significant technical content, appear ill-
equipped to cope with this and have come to rely on advice from experts. 
The establishment-fQjl the Australian National Animal Health Laboratory 
provides an example of technology decision-making by governments, using 
expert advisors. 
A number of investigations into ANAHL were carried out from 1964 
and these led to a Parliamentary Public Works Committee Inquiry in 1974. 
The technical nature of the proposal allowed the decision making to be 
defined as scientific, however, it is argued that the institutions -
committed to the establishment of ANAHL and their perceptions and 
definitions of need and their value judgements determined the nature of 
the decisions reached. Furthermore it is argued that these decisions 
had been made prior to the PWC Inquiry and that its purpose was to 
legitimate these decisions. As a result of controversy, shifts of 
emphasis and changes in the arguments justifying ANAHL were made by the 
proponents. This, however, served to highlight the uncertainties and 
value-judgements in the arguments and eventually led to a questioning of 
the credibility of the decision-making institutions and the proponents 
of ANAHL. 
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A Theoretical Framework 
Technology, defined in its widest sense as a tool, a technique or a 
social organisation or process, is an integral part of modem society 
and is inseparable from the social, economic or political structure of 
that society. 
The success of government collaboration with science during World 
i 
War II led to increased government support of scientific inquiry. This 
new government commitment was generally directed towards solving 
specific problems, often military, and these mission-oriented 
organisations represented "a major institutionalisation of science and 
technology as a formal tool for achieving government policy and 
corporate development."^ 
The large capital investment required and the high risk involved in 
the development of a new technology resulted in governments assuming the 
role of promoters of technology. But as well as having a direct 
influence as a technology customer in areas such as defence, energy, 
transportation, health, etc., governments have also affected the growth 
of the role of technology indirectly by providing incentives for private 
investment, by regulations of safety, environmental quality and business 
practices and by underwriting social overheads in support of scientific 
2 
research and specialised education. Governments may promote technology 
in particular sectors in order to realise various national goal s^ but 
not only is technology used to fulfil well defined needs, but social 4 
needs and values are themselves built and shaped by technology. 
The technological determinist model, which views technology as 
developing of its own accord and imposing itself on society, is clearly 
inadequate. Technology is not neutral, nor is it accidental or 
inevitable, but rather it is the outcome of particular choices. 
Although this may seem apparent in the case of military technology, 
where governments select particular technologies to achieve specific 
ends, it may be less obvious in other areas. 
In addition to^atsessing the consequences of a particular 
technology it is necessary to examine who selects and in whose interest 
technologies are selected, and to discover the economic, political and 
ideological considerations on which these choices are based. 
Problems Posed for Governments 
Wynne argues that 
"whereas technology is usually regarded as a 
(neutral) means, to social ends defined 
independently, one hopes, by democratic political 
institutions; in reality the complex, hugely costly, 
committed and powerful institutions set up as the 
organisational embodiment of technological means, 
gradually come to define social goals in terms of 
"needs" for major public investments in a particular 
form of transport, or energy technology, etc. And 
their perception of need - their definition of social 
values - naturally reflects tbeir commitments, since 
that is their raison d'etre." 
Once it is recognised that technology is not a neutral means to certain 
ends, it becomes necessary to ask not only what the consequences of a 
given technology are, but what were the reasons for its development and 
what interests are represented.^ 
Wenk points out that "by definition, decisions involve a choice of 
one alternative over another, but because choices can be more easily 
made of 'how' than on 'what', much of what passes for policy deals far 
more with means than with ends."^ Governments tend to respond to 
initiatives, finding means for certain ends, rather than developing 
g 
significant new issues, and these ends or goals are normally defined 
by agencies committed to particular technologies or industries. The way 
these institutions perceive and define need reflects their commitments 
and definition of social value, thus assessment of need becomes a 
"vehicle of advocac>^^fether than an impartial analysis".^ 
i 
Furthermore, Wynne points out that usually only a single technology 
is evaluated in the decision-making process thus avoiding the question 
of relative benefits, "a more overtly political question."^So not only 
is the goal itself not questioned critically, but other ways of 
achieving this goal, along with their costs, both economic and social, 
are not investigated. 
Often the goal is stated very imprecisely so that it becomes 
difficult to criticise and show that this may not be the most effective 
way of meeting those objectives.^^ As well as this, Collingridge claims 
12 
that objectives can be changed to protect a decision made in the past, 
and if a project "is found not to serve its original objective, an 
13 
objective is invented which it does serve." 
It could be argued that governments are ill-equipped to make 
decisions regarding technology because of the complexity and 
increasingly scientific nature of the proposals. In some instances this 
has resulted in the credibility of the institution involved being 
assessed rather than the technology itself. As Wynne says, 
"impartiality, accountability and social identification become key 
14 factors." In other cases, advisors or experts are introduced into the 
assessment procedure to provide the expertise that governments lack. 
The Role of Experts 
The increasing complexity of, and dependence on, technology, and 
the widening intelligibility gap between experts on the one hand and 
decision-makers and general public on the other, has increased the 
dependence of decisionmakers on experts. However the need for experts 
implies that scientific knowledge is neutral and decisions are ^ 
scientific or technical rather than political. This view ignores the 
15 
fact that experts often define the decision-making problem and that 
problem formulation, data collection and analysis, and implementation 
16 
are all value-laden. Although scientists are at pains to stress their 
objectivity, their detached, impersonal open-minded gathering of 
evidence, they in fact have political views and biases and personal or 
professional interests at stake. Mazur also suggests that the political 
context affects the way scientists present their findings and hence 
their influence on decisions,^^ and Ronge states "scientific advice 
transferred to the political decision-making system inevitably undergoes 18 
transformation - it receives a political 'mark' and meaning." 
The objectivity and neutrality of scientific and technical truths 
can be called into question by the existence of opposing experts. If 
experts disagree and one side cannot simply be shows to be wrong then 
the existence of the disagreement indicates that interpretations and 
value judgements play a significant role in the scientific enterprise. 
Disputes among experts can become a major source of confusion for policy 19 
makers and the public. 
Part of the confusion is due to the distinction that is often made 
between the informational and decision-making aspects of technology 
assessment. However, not only are the perspectives of the decision 
maker important in deciding what information is relevant, but the 
perspective of the expert and thus the information he presents is also 
important. 
Weinberg proposed the term "trans-science" for those questions at 
the interface between'^cience and politics which can be stated in 
i 
scientific terms but which are "in principle beyond the proficiency of 
science to answer". He claims that scientific truth can be established 
by peer review but where trans-science is involved "wisdom (rather than 
20 
truth) must be arrived at by some other mechanism". 
Experts maintain their position and hence their influence through 
their control of and access to specialized knowledge. However Elliott 
and Elliott point out that experts themselves lack any independent power 
but instead serve the already dominant groups and institutions of 
21 society, and Ronge claims that "serving political institutions does 
22 
not per se imply to serve society". 
The goals of science cannot be taken as a source of definition of 
23 
social goals just as the public interest cannot be assumed to be 
identical to the interest of the bureaucrats and industrialists. 
Primack and Von Hippie claim that there is a tendency for 
governments to select advisors who have political views similar to the 
officials they are advising and, as a result, politically useful 24 
conclusions are encouraged and usually received. 
The use of experts is in itself a political act, and scientific 
knowledge is used as a rational basis for substantive planning and to 
legitimate decisions. The assumption that scientific knowledge is 
rational because it is based on objective data gathered through rational 
procedures allows policy makers to define decisions as technical rather 
than political. 
Decision Making 
Decision making^c^ften involves dealing with uncertainty where, 
although all the possible outcomes or states of nature are identi-^iable, 
adequate factual information about them is not available. Collingridge 
claims however that technology decision making involves decision making 
26 
under ignorance. He argues that because of the nature of technology, 
the effects are inevitably unforeseeable and therefore all the relevant 
states of nature cannot be identified. This means it is not possible,to 
guarantee freedom from error or even to assess a decision as rational or 
irrational since new information may become available which would 
indicate that a different decision could have been made to achieve the 
defined objective. This ignorance is usually not acknowledged by 
decision makers who emphasise the "factual" and "scientific" nature of 
decisions. Wynne claims that the "way in which technical, social and 
values-uncertainties are defined, concealed or confused is a key aspect 27 of the relations of power which are exercised in technology assessment."^ 
By using "spurious images of certainty" decision makers or advisors are 
28 
able to "gain authority on specific decisions and issues." 
One way that decision makers conceal or confuse uncertainty or 
ignorance is to focus on questions of risk and cost, which "can be 
phrased in more factual terms" and hasten to skim over questions about 
benefit and need which "by definition raise the latent and more 
difficult questions of social values more or less directly." 
But even the notion of risk and cost can be problemmatic. Lowrance 
divides the assessment of risk into two activities; that of measuring 
risks, an empirical scientific activity, and judging safety, a normative 
30 
political activity. But this overlooks the fact that risks have to be 
identified before they can be measured, and the liklihood of their 
occurrence and their magnitude have to be estimated, an activity often 
involving considerable uncertainty and interpretation. As Conrad points 
out 
"the distinction between the estimation and eval-
uation of risks ... is misleading in its claim to 
identify and quantify risks in a neutral and 
- objective way, leaving the problem of evaluation to 
an independent secondary s t e p . " ^ ! 
Thus it becomes apparent that risk assessment is not an objective, 
neutral activity but is dependent on the social perception of risk. 
Lowrance identifies a number of factors which influence this perception; 
the risk is borne voluntarily or involuntarily, the effect is immediate 
or delayed, there are no other alternatives or many alternatives, the 
risk is known with certainty or unknown, exposure is a luxury or 
essential, it involves a common hazard or a dread hazard, the 
consequences are reversible or irreversible, it will be used as intended 
32 
or likely to be misused. Although these are useful categories, they 
fail to take account of the fact that acceptability or risk is dependent 
on specific circumstances and is judged differently by individuals. 
Furthermore Conrad points out that the 
"imposition of risk on others (decisions on 
technological risks are never made by the group 
exposed to the risks) can be interpreted as a form of 
oppression, regardless of the subjective 
understanding of any of the agents." 
In his analysis of political decision-making, Ronge introduces a 
two-dimensional concept which focuses on the interrelationship of the 
political system and the economic system. The political system no longer 
appears the central decision-making agency in his analysis and he 
identifies the following determinants of political decision making. 
1. The political system is by no means autonomous in choosing its 
i 
tasks and ends. It is more reactive in character than active. 
2. There are not only general (human), but also specific informational 
limits affecting political decision-making, which mainly result 
from the decentralised structure of capitalist economy to which 
\ 
policy-making refers and is bound. 
3. The political system.is basically dependent on fiscal resources to 
be extracted from the production process (growth dividend). This 
extractability is not unlimited, and this fact results in various 
determinations of political decision-making. 
4. Another limitation of political decision-making stems from the ever 
precarious power base of the political system. It has to execute 
its decision and although the system is also producing 
34 
legitimation, social compliance cannot be regarded as unlimited. 
Often more than one institution or group is involved in decision 
making and Gibbons recognises this in his notion of the technology 
assessment system which he sees as comprising "those social groups which 
are (or should be) concerned with developing a given technological 
programme." ̂ ^ The elements of the system need not be formally bound and 
can vary with the technology under consideration. 
Gibbons then takes the analysis a step further and identifies three 
classes of actor within the technology assessment system. These classes 
are "distinguished by their degree of involvement with the development 
of a technological capability." The main actors, or core actors, are 
only few but are "intimately and continuously involved in the process of 
development". On the next level are supporting actors who "may have an 
interest in one or more aspects of the development of a given technology 
but by and large they affect it only tangentially." The third grgup 
consists of those who "should be but are not involved in the technology 
assessment process." ̂ ^ It would seem that often the members of this 
group could only be recognised in retrospect, and then only if the 
technology or the decision-making surrounding it were called into 
question. Gibbons recognises that this group is most likely to be ill-
organised and financially weak and therefore unable, realistically to 
participate in decision making. But as well a this they may be unaware 
of the decision making or its consequences and therefore may only appear 
as opponents after decision making has occurred. This disadvantages 
them further since they then have to fight for a reversal or at least an 
amendment of a decision already established. 
So an analysis of technology decision making involves consideration 
of those groups involved in the decision-making process and their 
perceptions, goals and influence. But as well as this, there needs to be 
consideration of the wider political and economic factors and 
recognition of the uncertainty and ignorance involved in the process. 
An example of decision-making within the realm of government on a 
matter of significant technical content is provided by ANAHL. The 
technical nature of the proposal allowed the interested parties to 
define the decision-making as scientific. In this way value judgements 
and uncertainties were able to be concealed by the scientific arguments 
of the experts. However the experts and advisors were committed to the 
establishment of ANAHL, and their perceptions and value judgements had a 
considerable effect on the decisions reached. An examination of the 
decision-making process with regard to ANAHL should therefore provide 
insights into the political nature of technology decision-making. 
A HISTORY OF ANAHL^^ 
The history of ANAHL officially began with the Eichhorn Report of 
1964. Dr Eichhorn, a research officer of the US Department of 
Agriculture, was appointed counterpart-in-charge of the Palo Alto 
Diagnostic and Vaccine Production Institute during the Mexican/USA Foot-
and-Mouth Disease eradication campaign, which began in 1947. He was 
subsequently the first^ti^rector of the Pan-American FMD Center, Rio de 
* 
Janeiro (1952-55). When he visited Australia, he was a senior 
veterinarian in the Animal Production Branch of the Food and Agriculture 
38 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). 
According to CSIRO reports and publications, Dr Eichhorn's visit 
was at the invitation of the Department of Health. However, Dr 
Kesteven, who was at that time Director of the Animal Production and 
Health Division of FAO, claimed that "moves were initiated in 1964 at 
the request of the late Mr A. Maiden (then Secretary of the Department 
of Primary Industry) to request FAO to send the late Dr E. A. Eichhorn 
to Australia to draw up a plan to protect this continent from the 
disease." ^^ 
Regardless of whoever instigated this visit, the outcome was a 
recommendation that Australia establish its own maximum security 
laboratory to provide diagnostic and vaccine testing and production 
facilities in the event of an outbreak of exotic disease. 40 
Dr Kesteven also claimed that he undertook action to establish a 
National Animal Health Laboratory when he returned to Australia in 1969; 
however, an Inter-Departmental Commmittee (IDC) and a Commonwealth States 
Veterinary Committee (CSVC) Working Party had already been set up to 
investigate the need for such a facility. 
The CSYC, which was established in 1968, formed a Working Party 
whose terms of reference included an investigation of the desirability 
of, and need for, a maximum security animal health laboratory, its 
functions, siting and staffing. Its recommendations, supporting the 
establishment of such a facility, were presented to the Standing 
Committee on Agricul^re (SCA) in January 1970 and to the Australian 
Agricultural Council (AAC) in February 1970. The AAC was established in 
1934 and comprises the Federal Minister and State Ministers for 
Agriculture and its Standing Committee (SCA) comprises enior officers 
from those bodies. 
Independently of the CSVC, ttie Minister of Health set up an IDC 
made up of members from the Commonwealth Government Departments of ' 
Health, Primary Industry and Treasury and the CSIRO. Its 
recommendations, which were in general agreement with those of the DSVC, 
were presented to the SCA in June 1970 and to the AAC in July 1970. 
At the July meeting of the AAC, the SCA recommended that because of 
the great national importance of these proposals, a panel should be 
formed, comprising senior representatives of the States to consult with 
the Commonwealth. This Panel met in August, formed an eleven-man 
Advisory Proposal Committee which in turn formed a Proposal Evaluation 
Team (PET). Between October 1970 and December 1970, the members of PET 
visited fifteen overseas laboratories. The PET Report was published in 
1972 and this report formed the basis of a joint submission by the 
Ministers for Education and Science, Health, and Primary Industry to the 
Commonwealth Government. In October 1972 the Commonwealth Government 
agreed in principle to the establishment of a maximum security animal 
health laboratory. 
A further joint submission to the Government was made in 1973 by 
the Ministers for Science, Health, Primary Industry and Northern 
Development. This submission was accompanied by the CSIRO Proposal for 
a National Animal Health Laboratory Report of May 1973 and an 
Environmental Impact Study produced by the CSIRO and the Department of 
Works in October 1973. The Government approved the selection of .the 
* 
Geelong site in April 1974 and in July 1974 the proposal was referred to 
the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works (PWC) by the House 
of Representatives. 
The ten years from 1964 to 1974 could be considered a period of 
pre-hi story, involving various groups and committees and numerous 
reports and recommendations, but all outside the public arena. The next 
period from 1974 to 1980, although still involving insider groups and 
committees, takes on a more public aspect through the direct 
participation of Parliament. 
A public inquiry was held at Geelong in September 1974 by the PWC 
and the recommendations and conclusions contained in its report to 
Parliament were: 
i. There is a need to establish a maximum security Animal Health 
Laboratory to ensure the prompt and reliable diagnosis of exotic 
animal diseases, 
ii. The proposal is economically justified, 
iii. The "box within a box" principal of design of the Laboratory will 
ensure microbiological security, 
iv. The proposed functions of the Laboratory are appropriate. 
V. The precautions taken to prevent the escape of infectious disease 
viruses have been based on and are an improvement on measures which 
have been successful in a number of similar laboratores overseas, 
vi. After a suitable proving period the Laboratory should be authorised 
to handle foot and mouth disease virus prior to an outbreak of the 
disease in this country. 
vii. The site selec?t,€|pl is suitable. 
viii. The Committee recommend the construction of the work in tllis 
reference. 
ix. The Committee consider that the construction and establishment of 
41 
the Laboratory should proceed as a matter of urgency. 
This Report was accepted in its entirety when submitted to the 
Parliament in late 1974. 
Although a public hearing, only one private citizen, whose property 
was adjacent to the proposed site, entered a submission. Otherwise the 
hearing was dominated by the CSIRO, the Department of Health, the 
Department of Housing and Construction and the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics. The Australian National Cattle Council and the Australian 
Veterinary Association sent written submissions only. 
In 1977, the CSIRO and Department of Housing and Construction 
reviewed the project and in November 1977 the Government approved the 
rearrangement of buildings. 
After the discovery of a Bluetongue virus in Northern Australia in 
November 1977, four major primary producer organisations presented a 
submission to the Government calling for the immediate commencement of 
42 
construction of ANAHL. 
Although the PWC in 1974 concluded that construction should proceed 
as a matter of urgency, building did not begun until March 1978. 
In December 1979, the Government decided to accelerate construction 
by one year at an additional cost of $7 million. This followed an exotic 
disease scare at Legana in Tasmania, where pigs developed symptoms of a 
vesicular disease. 
In 1978 the ANAHL Consultative Committee was established by the 
Ministers for Health, Primary Industry and Science and Technology, to 
advise the CSIRO Executive on all matters pertaining to the program and 
operations of ANAHL. In 1979 this Committee recommended that ANAHL 
should undertake research on and development of FMD vaccines, which 
would involve the introduction of FMD virus prior to an outbreak of the 
disease in Australia. 
This proposal was put to the Animal Health Committee (formerly the 
CSVC) and the SCA and eventually the AAC itself. The AAC endorsed the 
introduction of live FMD virus prior to an outbreak in February 1980. 
The CSIRO Executive then advised the Minister for Science and the 
Environment that it would be in the national interest for ANAHL to have 
access to FMD virus in advance of an outbreak. The Minister for Science 
and the Environment sought the support of the Ministers for Primary 
Industry and Health in July 1980 and together they approached the Prime 
Minister, who endorsed this recommendation in November 1980. 
This decision heralded the start of much greater public involvement 
and controversy. Although triggered by the decision to import live FMD 
virus prior to an outbreak, the controversy extended to a questioning of 
the need for and the functions of ANAHL. 
Prior consultation with interested groups had not occurred and it 
was generally not known that such a decision had been approved. The 
first recorded public criticism of this decision was made by Professor 
B. Morris, Head of the Department of Immunology at the John Curtin 
School of Medical Research, ANU, in April 1981 at the Annual Conference 
of the Cattle Council of Australia. The debate was then extended to 
include primary producers and their organisations, scientists, 
veterinarians and évèntually the general public. 
In an attempt to resolve some of the conflict, the National'Farmers 
Federation with the aid of the CSIRO arranged an ANAHL Forum at Geelong 
in August 1982. Meanwhile in May 1982 the Australian Science and 
Technology Council (ASTEC) decided to undertake a study of ANAHL. When 
it became apparent that the ANAHL Forum had not resolved the major 
issues, ASTEC presented their report to the Prime Minister in Decemb'er 
1982. 
In October 1982 the Australian Academy of Science undertook a 
similar study and both these reports were tabled in Parliament in May 
1983. The findings of both these reports, that FMD virus should not be 
imported into Australia, formed the basis of the recommendations of the 
Minister for Science and Technology which were adopted by the Labor 
Caucus in May 1983. 
Although this decision settled the question of live FMD virus 
importation for the time being, the larger questions of the future of 
ANAHL, its functions and the role of the CSIRO have yet to be answered. 
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AN OVERVIEW 
The Australian National Animal Health Laboratory has been the 
subject of numerous investigation and reports during its long history. 
More recently it has been the subject of widespread debate. The 
technological nature of the project and the government involvement in 
its development make it an ideal subject for an examination of the role 
of governments in technology decision-making. 
The PWC Inquiry of September 1974 provides a central focus for this 
i 
study. There are several reasons for this. Although there were a number 
of investigations in the ten years after the initial proposal to 
establish a maximum security animal health laboratory in 1974, the PWC 
Inquiry provided a public record of previous recommendations, a 
rationalisation of these recommendations and directly involved the 
Government in decision maicing through its Parliamentary Standing 
Committee. Because of its public nature, the PWC Inquiry provided 
insights into the process of technology assessment and decision making, 
as well as the role played by experts and advisors. 
The PWC Inquiry also provided a reference point in later debates 
which questioned the need for, and the role of, ANAHL. The 
recommendations and conclusions which were reached by the PWC Committee 
were: 
1. There is a need to establish a maximum security Animal Health 
Laboratory to ensure the prompt and reliable diagnosis of exotic 
animal diseases. 
2. The proposal is economically justified. 
3. The 'box within a box' principal of design of the Laboratory will 
ensure microbiological security. 
4. The proposed functions of the Laboratory are appropriate. 
5. The precautions taken to prevent the escape of infectious disease 
viruses have been based on and are an improvement on measures which 
have been successful in a number of similar laboratories overseas. 
6. After a suitable proving period the Laboratory should be authorised 
to handle foot and mouth disease virus prior to an outbreak in this 
country. 
7. The site selected is suitable. 
8. The Committee recommend the construction of the work in this 
reference. 
9. The estimated cost of the proposal when referred to the Committee 
was $56 million. 
10. The reappraised estimate of cost as presented to the Committee is 
$67 million. 
11. The Committee consider that the construction and establishment of 
44 
the Laboratory should proceed as a matter of urgency. 
These conclusions became authoritative statements and were often used 
to legitimate later decisions. 
The CSIRO claimed that "the first recorded doubts about ANAHL were 
expressed by Dr A. K. Lascelles, the Chief of CSIRO's Division of Animal 45 
Health, in correspondence with a member of the Executive in 1976." 
Whilst supporting the establishment of a "maximum-security facility 
capable of providing the diagnostic backup in the event of an outbreak 
of FMD, he [Dr Lascelles] expressed concern about expenditure on what he 
saw as an unnecessarily large facility with broader functions than 
disease diagnosis - expenditure that he foresaw as being in competition 
with his Division's resource needs for research on diseases already 
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present in Australia." 
The public debate about ANAHL was initiated by a decision to import 
live FMD virus into Australia prior to an outbreak of the disease. In 
April 1981, Professor B. Morris, at the Annual Conference of the Cattle 
Council of Australia, questioned the need for, and the functions of 
ANAHL. This sparked off new interest and discussion on the role of 
ANAHL and the use of live viruses especially amongst scientists and 
* 
primary producers, and eventually led to the ANAHL Forum in August 1982 
where an attempt was made to resolve these questions. 
Oust a the early 1970s was a time of extensive investigations of 
the need and functions for ANAHL, so the early 1980s became a time of 
extensive debate on the necessity and advisability of importing FMD 
virus into Australia, and the recommendations of the PWC, that "After a 
suitable proving period the Laboratory should be authorised to handle 
foot and mouth disease virus prior to an outbreak of the disease in this 
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country", was used extensively to legitimate that decision. 
The question of live virus importation was settled in May 1983 when 
the Government decided to ban importation for at least five years. 
However by this time the controversy had extended to a public 
questioning of the need for ANAHL and the appropriateness of its 
functions. 
The live virus issue, although worthy of detailed examination, is 
outside the scope of this study. However it is important to note the 
following points: 
1. At the PWC Hearing all the submissions stated clearly that ANAHL 
would not be working with live FMD virus prior to an outbreak. The 
justifications of the need for, and functions of, ANAHL were 
therefore not dependent on FMDV being available. 
2. No justification for the PWC recommendation was given apart from 
ANAHL being designed to cope with FMD virus. 
3. When moves were first made to alter the decision to import live 
FMD, it was argued that ANAHL could not fulfil its functions 
without the live virus. 
So it would appear that, not only were the arguments justifying thé 
introduction of live virus unsuccessful on that score, but they had the 
unintended effect of calling into question the role of ANAHL. 
In answer to a question in Federal Parliament in September 1983 
regarding the future of ANAHL, Mr Barry Jones, Minister for Science and 
Technology, replied: "the Government is very concerned about the future 
of ANAHL." He also stated "the CSIRO is in a position of great 
embarrassment about the future of ANAHL." Mr Jones revealed that a 
Ministerial Committee would be established immediately to consider the 
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future of ANAHL. Two weeks later in Parliament Mr Jones stated: "Clearly 
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this Government has inherited a mess in regard to this situation." 
In October 1983 the Government established the Fenner Committee to 
advise on the best way of utilising the facilities of ANAHL. Following 
this announcement, Mr Barry Jones stated during an interview that there 
has been a "fundamental shift of function" brought about by changes 
in technology. Although he recognised that ANAHL had a "fixed form" 
which would limit new uses, he claimed that he would like to see it put 
to the "widest variety of uses" that would give "best value for money". 
Mr Jones stated in Parliament that three of the leaders of the 
CSIRO (the Chairman, Dr Wild, Professor Craig and Dr Boardman) had 
"conceded that, if we had known what we know now about the diagnostic 
changes brought about by the technological revolution of the last 
decade, the whole configuration of ANAHL would have been utterly 
different and it would have been established at infinitely less cost."^^ 
Nearly twenty years ago it was claimed that Australia needed a 
maximum security animal health laboratory. The estimated cost in April 
1974 was $56 million, in September 1974 it was $67 million and by 
September 1983 $157 million had been spent on its construction. Now in 
1983, it seems no one is sure why we need it, and Australia has inherited 
a $257 million facility without a function. 
The PWC Inquiry provides a basis for the structure of this study. 
Four of the major conclusions of the PWC Inquiry were: 
1. There is a need to establish a maximum security animal health 
1aboratory. 
2. The proposal is economically justifiable. 
3. The proposed functions are appropriate; and 
C O 
4. The site selected is suitable. 
These have been taken as the main decisions for analysis. The 
section dealing with the proposed functions of ANAHL has been subdivided 
into diagnostic function, training function, research function and 
vaccine production function, again following the PWC classification. 
The analysis is not, however, restricted to decisions made at the 
PWC Inquiry, but rather uses the arguments leading to these decisions as 
standards by which to gauge changes of emphasis or shifts in arguments 
over a period of time. It seeks to examine the sorts of arguments 
which were presented at various times, their val idity and influence, and 
the way in which particular scientif ic arguments and evidence were 
presented to support particular political outcomes. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE NEED FOR ANAHL 
THE NEED FOR ANAHL 
The establishment of a national animal health 1aboratory was 
initially proposed as the means whereby Australia could protect its 
livestock industry against exotic diseases. Although the Australian 
Agricultural Council had established an FMD Committee in 1952 (this 
later became the Exotic Diseases Sub-Committee of the Veterinary 
Committee of the SCA), and visits to overseas exotic disease courses at 
Plum Island USA and Grosse Island, Canada, by Government Veterinary 
Officers began in 1963, it was not until Dr Eichhorn's visit in 1964 
that a maximum-security diagnostic laboratory capable of producing and 
testing FMD vaccine was recommended. Dr Eichhorn was invited by the 
Government to investigate and report on Australia's preparedness to dope 
with outbreaks of exotic disease, however in view of his previous 
position as counterpart-in-charge of the Palo Alto Diagnostic and 
Vaccine Production Institute, his recommendation would not appear to be 
unexpected. 
A Working Party was established by the CSVC in 1968-69 to 
"investigate and report on the desirability of, and the need for, a 
facility in Australia for diagnosis and research of exotic diseases and 
for the preparation of appropriate vaccines and in particular to report 
on: 
i. Functions of the laboratory 
ii. The principles involved in the choice of 
a) site 
b) plans and facilities 
iii. Staff required 
iv. The overall control and supervision of the laboratory 
V. The integration of animal quarantine with such a facility 
vi. Any other related matters."^ 
One of its recommendations was that a maximum-security laboratory be 
established in Australia. 
The Inter-Departmental Committee, which was set up by the Minister 
of Health, also met several times during that period of 1968-69 and 
concluded that there was merit in the establishment of a laboratory that 
would be capable of diagnosing exotic diseases, instructing 
veterinarians in the control and field diagnosis of virus diseases and 
testing material from an animal quarantine station, and that could carry 
out research on indigenous Australian animal virus diseases.^ 
The findings of the CSVC Working Party and the IDC were submitted 
to the AAC in February 1970 and July 1970 respectively, and the SCA 
recommended to the AAC that a Panel, made up of senior representatives of 
the States should be formed to consult with senior Commonwealth 
officials, at a Ministerial level if necessary, regarding the protection 
of livestock industries against exotic diseases. This Panel under the 
Chairmanship of the Secretary to the Department of Primary Industry met 
in August 1970. The members of the Panel, apparently on the basis of the 
CSVC and IDC reports, agreed on the need for a maximum-security 
laboratory and then went on to propose a number of functions for this 
facility. 
Although the original question of how Australia should protect 
itself against exotic diseases would seem capable of being answered in a 
number of ways, once Dr Eichhorn made his suggestion on the 
establishment of a maximum-security laboratory, the wider question 
appeared not to be addressed again. The CSVC and IDC looked only at the 
desirability and need for the laboratory and not at whether or not there 
could be other ways of achieving this protection for Australia. At the 
PWC Hearing Dr Snowdon stated: 
"if it is accepted that Australia should acquire the 
capacity to undertake its own exotic disease diagnosis, 
the only alternative to one Australian laboratory 
such as proposed for ANAHL, is to provide separate ; 
facilities in each of the States." ^ 
By the time the AAC Panel considered the question in 1970, the need 
seemed assumed. The Chairman of the AAC Panel then invited the CSIRO to 
carry out a feasibility study. For this purpose a Proposal Evaluation 
Team (PET) was formed, consisting of representatives of the CSIRO, the 
Department of Health and the Department of Housing and Construction, and 
its objectives were: 
i. to determine the feasibility of establishing within Australia a 
research, diagnostic, and vaccine safety and potency testing 
laboratory together with a unit for producing FMD vaccine; 
ii. to estimate the approximate cost of establishing and running such a 
laboratory. 
The PET Report concluded that it would be feasible to construct a high 
security laboratory in Australia that could carry out the proposed 
functions without the risk of infective agents escaping.^ 
Although one of the terms of reference for the PWC Inquiry was to 
investigate the need for a maximum-security animal health laboratory, it 
is important to place this objective in an historical and political 
context. Already 10 years had elapsed since Dr Eichhorn's original 
recommendation, and during that time various committees had examined the 
proposal to establish such a laboratory. The PET had spent three months 
visiting overseas laboratories and their six volume report published in 
1972 documented detailed design and site specifications. The 
Commonwealth Government in 1972 had agreed in principle to the 
establishment of this laboratory and recommended that $200,000 be made 
available for further investigations that were needed for the 
preparation of complete design specifications. In 1973 the CSIRO; 
prepared a report on the proposed laboratory, and together with the 
Department of Housing and Construction had also prepared an 
environmental impact statement for the proposed site at Geelong. In 
April 1974, that is, five months prior to the PWC Hearing, the 
Government: 
i. approved the establishment of ANAHL on the Geelong Rifle Range 
Site; 
ii. agreed to the formation of a Consultative Committee to assist in 
the management of ANAHL; 
iii. had noted that the recurrent cost would be additional to the 
CSIRO's budget requirements; and 
iv. had approved the documentation of the project by the Department of 
Housing and Construction to the point where reference could be made 
to the PWC.^ 
In view of these investigations and Government commitment, it is 
not surprising that the question of need was not examined closely by the 
PWC and that questions of the proposed functions and microbiological 
security attracted greater attention. 
The arguments used by the CSIRO at the PWC to promote a need for 
ANAHL can be divided into two types. The first type of argument focused 
on the value of the livestock industry, its economic importance to 
Australia and the likely cost of an exotic disease outbreak. Dr Pierce 
stated in his part of the CSIRO submission "There are many major 
livestock diseases exotic to Australia which, if introduced, could have 
devastating consequences for our livestock industries and for the 
economy in general."^ 
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He then went on to describe the actual costs and impact of several 
types of animal diseases in various countries. The evidence presented 
was a description of what had happened elsewhere, yet at the end of this 
section Dr Pierce stated "the reasons why Australia needs a maximum-
security laboratory are apparent from what has already been said."^ 
However, a close examination of this information revealed no arguments, 
implicit or explicit, of the need for ANAHL and in fact the opposite 
conclusion could be drawn. It is difficult to understand how this 
information on the economic losses suffered by other countries through 
outbreaks of exotic disease could be used as an argument in favour of 
Australia establishing an animal health laboratory, especially when most 
of the countries in these examples had their own laboratories at the g 
time of the outbreak. In one example given of an outbreak of FMD in 
Britain, it was claimed that the cost of the 1967-8 outbreak was 
probably between $70-$150 million, yet the maximum security FMD World 
Reference Laboratory at Pirbright was well established at the time and 
veterinarians were well acquainted with the disease. 
The second type of argument used by the CSIRO concentrated on the 
inadequacy of quarantine to protect Australia and the increasing risk of 
an outbreak. Dr Pierce stated "The quarantine service operated by the 
Australian Department of Health has so far proved an effective barrier 
against the accidental introduction of these diseases, but no quarantine 
service, however efficient, can hope to provide an absolute guarantee 
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against their entry." Dr Pierce then went on to explain that 
Australia can no longer rely on its physical isolation with the advent 
of fast air travel and as more people travel to Australia "the risk of 
exotic diseases penetrating our quarantine barrier inevitably becomes 
greater." 
During cross-examination Senator Poyser (PWC Member) questioned this 
assertion, indicated surprise that this was included in the CSIRO 
Submission rather than the Department of Health submission, and asked "is 
this an assessment of CSIRO in relation to this matter?" Dr Allen for 
the CSIRO replied: "I think the simple fact is that it is one of the 
points of observation which have a bearing on the need for this 
laboratory and Section A is, of course, concerned with the need for the 
laboratory and it is brought out there as one of the factors which is 
widely recognised, I believe. It does not represent a formal assessment 
on our part, but it is a fact which I think most people are aware of and 
it is fairly widely quoted." ̂ ^ 
On the basis of this "widely quoted" observation Dr Pierce stated 
in his submission that there is a "real and growing probability that an 
exotic virus will, sooner or later, penetrate Australia's quarantine 
barriers". ^^ However in the next paragraph he stated, "An Australian 
National Animal Health Laboratory with maximum-security facility cannot 
keep exotic diseases out of Australia; that is not its purpose. Rather 
the Laboratory is an insurance against the day an outbreak of an exotic 
disease occurs. When that happens, the Laboratory will be a vital 
factor in minimising the impact that such an outbreak could have on the 
Australian economy. 
The Department of Health submission also made reference, but only 
briefly, to these two types of arguments. In the introduction of their 
submission it was pointed out that "Australia is now the world's largest 
exporter of meat and has an increasing trade in livestock, both in the 
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numbers of animals exported and in the range of countries prepared to 
import Australian stock. This favourable situation is due in large 
measure to the continued freedom of Australia from a number of serious 
exotic diseases of animals."^"^ 
It-was also stated that "no system of quarantine is infal1ible".^^ 
But by and large, the Department of Health left this line of argument to 
the CSIRO and instead concentrated on ANAHL's relationship to the high 
security animal quarantine station on the Cocos Islands. It was argued 
that Australia's livestock industry was disadvantaged since strict 
quarantine meant a "lack of access to the wider range of genetic 
material in breeds and strains in other countries." ^^ The establishment 
of ANAHL, it was argued, would facilitate importation of livestock from 
overseas and would "permit full utilisation of the facilities of the 
station and provide a substantial work programme for ANAHL." ^^ 
During questioning, Mr Gee, in his capacity as First Assistant 
Director-General, Quarantine Division, Department of Health, elaborated 
on this and extended the role of ANAHL to facilitating exportation as 
well as importation. He said: 
"I think the establishment of the island quarantine 
station which will permit us to import new genetic 
breeds and multiply them in Australia will then allow 
us to be an even greater exporter. For example, 
there are breeds of cattle in Africa that nobody can 
get access to because there is not a facility capable 
of handling them. If we were able - through the 
combination of our off-shore quarantine station and 
this laboratory that we are discussing today - to 
import say the Africander or Booran cattle from 
Africa, clear them disease-free into the Australian 
environment and multiply them for export then to 
other countries which are never going to have the 
capacity to get them safely, we are going to have a 
real gold mine from the point of view of potential ^g • 
for the export of unusual breeds and useful breeds." 
It would seem curious that the US, for example, had not taken 
advantage of this "gold mine" given their quarantine stations, maximum 
security laboratory at Plum Island and climatic conditions similar to 
Australia. Mr Gee's simplistic account fails to recognise that only 
known and studied diseases can be identified, yet it is possible that 
imported African cattle could introduce previously unknown diseases with 
unknown effects in a new environment thus creating a potentially 
disastrous situation. 
Mr Gee was then questioned about the danger of an exotic disease 
entering Australia. Mr Garrick asked him what sort of extra precautions 
he would like to see. Mr Gee replied: 
"I think that our precautions at the moment are 
adequate. We get periodic problems through human 
error, admittedly, which are very quickly brought to 
our attention, but I think as air traffic increases 
that we will require more staff to be able to handle 
the people and their goods. ... The main answer I 
think will be people to deal with the increased 
numbers of passengers and increased numbers of 
aeroplanes rather than involved and expensive 
equipment or research." ^^ 
Mr Keogh then asked if Mr Gee could assure the Committee that the 
Quarantine Division would be able to cope with an increased risk and Mr 
Gee replied: "I am sure that we can cope with the increased risk ... I 
am satisfied that we will be able to effectively maintain our existing 
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quarantine security." 
When Mr Keogh suggested that the CSIRO evidence made it appear that 
the entry of FMD disease would be inevitable Mr Gee replied: 
"No, I do not think that it is inevitable, but I 
certainly would not be prepared to say there is 
absolutely no risk. There is a continuing, although 
small, risk in my opinion of FMD being imported into ^ 
the country. I think the risk is very low while we do 
not permit the import of live animals or livestock 
products from FMD infected countries ... the 
probability of the disease being transmitted by shoes 
and clothing to animals in a dose sufficiently high 
to set up the infection and to initiate an outbreak, 
I think is low ... I do not believe there is an 
extremely high risk of the introduction of FMD."^^ 
It would appear that Mr Gee's replies seriously undermined the 
CSIRO arguments regarding the increasing danger and inevitability of the 
increasing risk,however this appeared to be ignored by the PWC when 
discussing the need for ANAHL in their Report. The Report began with 
information about the size and value of the Australian livestock 
industry, then discussed the inadequacy of the quarantine service, often 
quoting directly from the CSIRO submission and concluded with the CSIRO 
statement that "the risk of exotic disease penetrating our quarantine 
barrier inevitably becomes greater. 
Mr Gee's statement that "the risk [of FMD being imported into the 
country] is very low while we do not permit the import of live animals 
or livestock products from FMD infected countries"^^ also brought into 
question the advisability of importing livestock, a point overlooked by 
the PWC. It could be argued that ANAHL's presence, by facilitating 
importation of livestock from such places as Africa and Asia, could 
increase the risk of an exotic disease outbreak, thereby weakening the 
Department of Health's case. 
The effectiveness of the arguments used by the CSIRO and the 
Department of Health was reflected in the other submissions to the PWC. 
The conclusion to the Australian National Cattlemen's Council read: 
"The ANCC urges the Australian Government to proceed 
with the construction of the ANAHL as expenditure of 
the capital costs involved together with the 
associated operating expenses represent a small cost • 
compared with the loss of revenue that would result 
should FMD occur in this country. This Council urges 
that construction commence on this laboratory as soon 
as feasible and that every effort be made to complete 
the laboratory within the specified time. With the 
increase of frequency of air travel, risks will 
continue in regards to the introduction of exotic 
diseases and over the period that this laboratory is 
under construction, the Australian livestock industry 
will remain vulnerable. 
This Council also welcomes the announcement 
that an Animal Health Bureau is to be established to 
coordinate all areas of animal health control. The 
ANAHL being associated with the Animal Health Bureau 
and the off-shore quarantine station will go a long 
way to guarantee the economic viability of the 
Australian cattle industry." 24 
Although this used the argument of increasing risk, it concentrated 
on the economic importance of the livestock industry and the potential 
to increase its viability, to justify the need for ANAHL. 
The Australian Veterinary Association submission, on the other 
hand, supported the functions of the BAH and emphasised the risk 
aspect, quoting Dr Pierce, that "the laboratory is an insurance 
against the day an outbreak of exotic disease occurs." ^^ Apparently the 
AVA, like the CSIRO, but unlike Mr Gee of the Quarantine Division, 
believed an outbreak was inevitable. 
The Geelong Regional Planning Authority, which is made up of two 
representatives from the nine municipalities in the Geelong region and 
financed directly by these municipalities, stated in its submission to 
the PWC: "[ANAHL] is considered essential not only to safeguard the 
existing Australian livestock industry which had an estimated gross 
value of production in 1972-73 of $3,000 million but also to ensure the 
future development of the livestock industry via the use of ANAHL as a 
progressive, dynamic and probing research laboratory." . 
Although the GRPA was anxious for ANAHL to be sited at Geelong, it 
is interesting that they presented an argument of the need for the 
laboratory to the PWC, a subject which would appear to be outside their 
area of expertise. 
Thé Department of Agriculture presented a submission entitled "The 
Importance of the ANAHL for the Functioning of the Proposed Bureau of 
Animal Health." The functions of the Bureau were listed as: 
1. A national uniform disease recording and trace-back system. 
2. Planning and coordination of animal disease control programs. 
3. Epidemiology studies relating to necessary field of research. 
4. Determining priorities and planning disease control. 
5. Overseas reporting on animal disease in Australia.^^ 
It was claimed that "without such a maximum security health laboratory, 
the Bureau would not be in a position to carry out many of its functions 
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efficiently and in some case not at all." However it was not evident 
from these functions, even when elaborated later in the submission, nor 
was it explained, why a maximum security laboratory was necessary to 
carry out this work. 
Mr Kelly of th PWC Committee made the interesting observation 
early in the hearing that 
"it seems ... that we are tackling this problem 
probably from the wrong way round in terms of time. 
One would have thought that the proper way for the 
machine to run would be to have the Animal Health 
Bureau first and it would recommend the erection of 
the Animal Health Laboratory, and then afterwards 
would come the quarantine station. But the way we 
deal with it in Australia is that we have the 
quarantine station first the laboratory second and the 
Animal Health Bureau third." 
This sequence of events was, however, used to advantage. The 
approval of the quarantine station, an infinitely less costly project, 
cleared the way for and provided a justification of the need for ANAHL 
and ANAHL in turn provided justification for establishing a Bureau of 
Animal Health, a body which would usurp the duties of other government 
departments. 
In 1977, three years after the PWC Inquiry, work had not begun on 
the construction of ANAHL. A Bluetongue disease outbreak scare in 
Northern Australia resulted in primary industry groups submitting a 
document entitled "The Urgent Case" to the Government, calling for an 
immediate start to construction. This document again stressed the 
economic importance of the livestock industry and relied heavily on the 
arguments of the increasing risk of the introduction of exotic disease, 
using the recent Bluetongue scare and figures on the number of 
travellers to Australia to demonstrate this. The primary industry 
organisations stated "Livestock forms a major component of Australia's 
export income. This valuable facet of Australian trade and industry 
must be protected." They also strengthened the risk argument in their 
claim that "we believe that the risks of a serious outbreak of an exotic 
disease have increased to such a degree that it is not now a case of 
'if there is a serious outbreak in this country, but, rather, 'when'."^^ 
Although there have been criticisms of the functions, arguments 
about the need for ANAHL have not been seriously challenged until 
recently. In the April 1982 Report "Live Exotic Disease Agents at 
ANAHL" the CSIRO stated: "The need for ANAHL and its functions were 
firmly established in 1970 by the AAC and reaffirmed by the PWC in 
1974." ^^ 
The ASTEC Report of December 1982, although critical of some of the 
functions of ANAHL reaffirms the need for the facility using the ¿same 
arguments of the value of the industry and the increasing danger of an 
exotic disease entering Australia. They claimed that "Australia needs a 
microbiologically secure animal health laboratory and the underlying 
rationale for ANAHL has not diminished since the concept was developed 
in the early 1970's." ^^ 
Although Mr Gee, when representing the Quarantine Service, 
disagreed with the CSIRO arguments of the inevitable risk of an exotic 
disease being introduced, after assuming the position of Director of the 
Bureau of Animal Health his views appeared to change. He was reported 
as saying that "quarantine could no longer completely protect Australia 
against exotic animal d i s e a s e s " . I n a speech at the ANAHL Forum, he 
stated "I do not consider that there is any real risk or any high risk 
at all of FMD being introduced into Australia with live animals, but 
there is a constant risk of it getting in with smuggled livestock 
products. Another risk, and I fear a greater one is that of sabotage. 
This would appear to contradict his statements at the PWC Hearing 
where he claimed that the Quarantine Service would be able to "handle 
the people and the goods" but that the greatest risk would come from 
importing "live animals from FMD infected c o u n t r i e s . S i r William 
Henderson confirmed this earlier view in his speech at the ANAHL Forum 
when he stated, "By far the most frequent way that FMD disease is spread 
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is by movement of livestock." 
The threat of sabotage was a new weapon in the armoury of the ANAHL 
proponents. Later in the ANAHL Forum, Dr Snowdon (now Officer-in-Charge 
of ANAHL) also referred to sabotage stating, "an assessment of the threat 
to ANAHL from groups both within and outside Australia has been made by 
i 
Australia's security organisation. It was concluded that at present 
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there were no significant threats from either groups." 
It is interesting to speculate why Mr Gee introduced the 
possibility if it had already been investigated and dismissed. Its use 
as an argument would seem to add credence to Dr Gibbs suggestion that 40 
the proponents were "trying to scare the farmers". 
It would appear that there was often a confusion of arguments and 
unwarranted extensions made to the arguments of the need for ANAHL. 
The importance and economic value of the livestock industry to Australia 
may provide excellent grounds for justifying some action to protect it, 
but this in no way implies that ANAHL is the only answer, or indeed an 
answer at all. 
There also appeared to be some confusion about the meaning of 
"protect Australia's livestock industries". This phrase was often used 
to suggest that ANAHL could prevent an outbreak occurring, leading to 
claims that ANAHL is "essential to safeguard""^^ the livestock industry and 
"to maintain its position with meat-importing countries as a disease-
free area","^^ whereas what was being claimed was that ANAHL would be a 
"factor in minimising the impact that such an outbreak could have on the 
e c o n o m y " . ( T h e contentious nature of this claim will be examined in a 
later section.) But if, as the CSIRO pointed out, ANAHL "cannot keep 
exotic diseases out of Australia",^^ a statement that was often overlooked, 
then ANAHL could only be justified as a protector of the livestock 
industry if it was demonstrated that an outbreak was likely to occur. 
It is perhaps relevant at this time to point out that Australia has 
not had an outbreak of FMD since 1872 , rabies since 1867 or Rinderpest 
since 1923. Contagious bovine pi euro-pneumonia, which entered Australia 
45 
in 1858 was eradicated in 1967. The Consultative Committee of the AAC, 
which meets only in the face of a suspected disease situation has met 
only four times in the last twenty years; in 1966 in regard to a "very 46 
mild strain of Newcastle disease", in 1973 for what was incorrectly 
thought to be a disease in horses, in 1977 when the non-virulent 
Bluetongue virus was discovered in Northern Australia and in 1982 for 
the Legana pig incident in Tasmania. 
The only evidence given by the CSIRO to support their argument that 
an outbreak is inevitable was the increased speed of travel and the 
increasing number of travellers to Australia. However an article by 
John Fisher^^ suggested that the relative dryness and high levels of 
direct sun in Australia provide a natural barrier to epidemic infection. 
He argued that if this were not so, we should have experienced large 
outbreaks in the Nineteenth Century when stock was imported from the 
United Kingdom and quarantine was less stringent. 
This view was also held by M. J. Howell, Senior Lecturer in Zoology 
at the Australian National University. In a letter to the Canberra 
Times he stated "one of the most curious aspects about FMD virus is that 
it is not already established in Australia, given 200 years of 
colonisation from epidemic foci in Europe and the widespread 
introduction of livestock in the early years of settlement ... It would 
seem reasonable to suggest that Australia is not particularly hospitable 
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towards some disease agents - perhaps including FMD." 
At the PWC Hearing Dr Snowdon spoke of low susceptibility of 
Australian native animals to FMD and continued, "we believe the fauna 
would not constitute a grave risk should we have an outbreak of FMD in 
Austral i a. 
Unfortunately, at the time of writing, documents and reports of the 
period 1964-1972, although applied for, were not available and their 
contents had to be gleaned from later reports and histories. However 
this in itself is significant and Conrad makes the point that "basic 
decisions regarding technologies are rarely put at the disposal of the 
general public and scientific evaluations of projects generally only 
have a legitimating character. 
The need for ANAHL was firmly established by 1970 and one can only 
speculate on the arguments put forward, since "the way a decision is 
arrived at and the way it is rationally accounted for post hoc on a 
consistent basis are not the same."^^ 
By the time the PET was formed in August 1970, its terms of 
reference were to determine feasibility, not need. Conrad again makes 
the point that "technology assessments or environmental assessments tend 
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to enter once the major policy options have been established". 
Furthermore, these policy options have been established by members of 
committed institutions which "gradually come to define social goals in 
terms of 'needs' for major public investments in a particular form of 
technology. And their perception of need - their definition of social 
values - naturally reflects their commitments, since that is their 
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raison d'etre." 
Once the proposal had reached the stage of a PWC Inquiry it had 
been extensively examined and gained Government support. The need for 
the facility seemed by then to be assumed self-evident and rigorous 
arguments of need were not put forward. Wynne emphasises the point that 
the debates surrounding the assessment of technology focus on questions 
of risks and costs and skim over benefits and needs. This he claims is 
because risks and costs can be "phrased in more factual terms"54 whereas 
need and benefit reflect social values more directly. 
In the case of ANAHL, although "factual" information on the 
economic importance of the livestock industry and the increasing number 
of travellers was presented, it was not made explicit that the 
interpretation of this information and its perception as a risk, and in 
particular the degree of risk involved, was value laden. Although the 
uncertainty in the assessment of risk was indicated by Mr Gee's evidence 
which conflicted with the arguments of the CSIRO, this conclusion was 
avoided by the PWC and the need for ANAHL was taken as proved. 
The objective of Dr Eichhorn's visit was to investigate Australia's 
preparedness to cope with an exotic disease outbreak. As well as con-
taining an implicit assumption that an outbreak was likely, this 
objective is stated imprecisely. Collingridge points out that if an 
objective is stated imprecisely it is often difficult to criticise 
decisions and show that they may not be the most effective way of 
meeting those objectives.^^ Wynne states that a characteristic of most 
technology assessment is that usually only a single technology is 
evaluated and the question of relative benefits, "a more overtly 
political question" is avoided.^^ Questions of how else this objective 
could be achieved were not addressed and all investigations ubsequent 
to Dr Eichhorn's visit concentrated on assessing the need for a maximum 
security animal health laboratory and not on how Australia could best 
prepare and protect itself. 
In a CSIRO News Release, Dr Wild, Chairman of the CSIRO, stated: 
"CSIRO, like ASTEC, the National Farmers' Federation and worldwide 
expert opinion, believes that ANAHL is needed now as before to diagnose 
and combat exotic animal diseases. It is noteworthy that Canada is now 
to build a high security laboratory modelled on ANAHL ... The $150 
million capital investment is a small price to pay to help protect 
Australia's $1500 million per year export meat industry."^^ 
After twenty years the same argument is being used: we need ANAHL 
to protect our livestock industries. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
An important component in the arguments justifying the need for 
ANAHL and its economic viability was the cost benefit analysis 
undertaken by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in June 1974 at the 
request of Dr Kesteven (Consultant, Department of Agriculture) and 
presented to the PWC Hearing. 
The question of economic viability had not been addressed pr;ior 
to this study. When the proposal to establish a national animal health 
laboratory went to the Government in October 1972 not even a formal cost 
was stated. ̂  At the PWC Hearing neither the CSIRO nor Department of 
Health included a statement of the cost of the facility. Mr Kelly (PWC 
Member) remarked "This is the first time I have seen such a submissipn 
without any mention of the question of the cost of it. There is a 
certain coyness in the evidence. No one mentions such a mundane matter 
as money, but one of the things you must do when you have to evaluate 
the need for it is put it alongside the cost of it. What is also 
notable is that there has been no discussion about the operating costs of 
it."^ Mr Kelly also noted: "It is unusual that it should go to Cabinet 
without a price tag on it."^ 
Although submissions to the PWC Hearing contained general 
suggestions of the benefits that would result from the establishment of 
ANAHL the BAE study attempted to identify and quantify these benefits. 
On the basis of this study alone the PWC concluded that the proposal to 
build ANAHL was economically justified. In its Report the PWC stated: 
" In an examination of the economic aspects of the 
Animal Health Laboratory proposal, the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics concluded that it could be a 
viable proposition as a result of the expected 
benefits arising from research programs alone and if 
these benefits were combined with a disease outbreak 
situation, there seems to be little doubt regarding 
the economic viability of the p r o p o s a l . 
Since subsequent reports and discussions apparently assumed the 
economic viability of ANAHL on the basis of the PWC investigation it is 
important not only to examine the BAE Report itself but to investigate 
the PWC's assessment of it. 
The objective of cost benefit analysis is to determine whether the 
benefits derived from a project outweigh the costs incurred. In order 
to achieve this objective, the costs and benefits have first to be 
identified, and then ascribed a monetary value. One criticism of cost 
» 
benefit analysis is that not all the costs and benefits can be or are 
identified, nor can they always be quantified. As well as the direct 
costs and benefits, a number of other factors have an impact on the 
analysis; these include the time period adopted, the discount rate 
selected, the decision criteria, external costs and social costs as well 
as a number of background assumptions, both stated and unstated. All 
these factors require a judgment to be made, often on little or no 
evidence, but once they have been expressed numerically and then 
manipulated according to formal rul 
es they tend to be assigned an 
objectivity and certainty. ̂  
The approach taken by the BAE was to attempt to calculate the 
magnitude of the benefits needed to equal the estimated costs of 
building and running ANAHL and it was assumed that tangible benefits 
would result and that these benefits could be measured in monetary 
terms. 
The report admitted the analysis was extremely approximate: "There 
is a large degree of uncertainty associated with the type of benefits, 
their possible magnitude and time of occurrence. Virtually no data were 
available on any of these aspects." However three sources of benefits 
were identified on the basis of "various descriptions of the objectives 
and functions" ̂  of ANAHL and were listed in the summary and conclusions 
as: * 
a) the prevention of substantial losses in export revenues earned from 
livestock product sales; 
b) the reduction in production losses and livestock slaughterings that 
might be considered necessary without an ANAHL; and 
c) the benefits which might be expected to be derived from programs of 
g 
research at the laboratory. 
In order to give an estimate of these benefits in monetary terms 
the following twelve assumptions were adopted by the BAE: 
1. Outbreaks of foot and mouth disease (FMD) only 
were taken into account. 
2. Capital costs of the NAHL: $56 million allo-
cated over the construction period. 
3. Construction period of the NAHL: Ten years. 
4. Effective productive capacity of the NAHL: Zero 
from years 0 to 10 positive from years 11 to 
50. Although the potential for benefits to be 
generated in years 7 to 10, when the Laboratory 
is nearing completion, is recognised, the 
provision of insufficient data precludes their 
estimation. 
5. Effective life of the Laboratory: 40 years 
(i.e., years 11 to 50).* 
6. Annual operating costs of the Laboratory: 
Beginning in year 7 and growing to $2.8 million 
per annum in the years 11 to 50 under a 
quiescent disease situation. Outbreak control 
costs were unknown but it was assumed that in 
years of disease outbreak the $2.85 million 
would probably increase substantially but no 
assumption as to the magnitude of the possible 
increase was made. From preliminary results 
obtained it was considered unnecessary that 
such an estimate was required. 
7. Discount rate: 8 per cent. 
8. Value of livestock and livestock products: 
Based on 1972-73 levels and prices which were 
assumed to continue in the future. Hence the 
relationship between the estimates of costs 
above and the prices received was assumed to 
remain constant over time. 
Production** - All livestock, $3,384 
million per annum; sheep and cattle, 
$3,113 million per annum. 
Exports - Beef, wool, mutton and 
lamb - about $2,000 million per annum. 
9. Sheep population: 140 million head, valued at 
$10 per head. 
10. Cattle population: 28 million head, valued at 
$100 per head. 
11. Beef exported to the USA and Japan: approx-
imately 400,000 tonnes or 68 per cent of total 
beef exports. 
12. Main sources of benefits due to the operation 
of the NAHL: 
Reduction in losses on export markets, 
domestic livestock production and stock 
slaughtered for disease control. 
Benefits from training, research and 
technological advances at the Laboratory. 
* Because of the discounting procedures used the 
addition to the present value of benefits for 
those received beyond year 50 has only a very 
minor effect. 
** BAE 'Trends in Australian Rural Production and 
Exports' No.69 March 21974. As at 31 March 
1974 total sheep numbers were 148 million and 
total cattle (beef and dairy) were 31.1 million. 
These assumptions can be divided into two types. The first type 
included estimates of the number of livestock and the value of 
livestock and livestock products along with estimates of the cost of 
ANAHL and the time of construction, and these could be described as scale 
assumptions. While there is room for debate over the precise value 
assigned to these assumptions, the validity of the item itself is not in 
dispute, i.e., a variety of figures could be given for the value^of 
livestock for example, but no one would argue that the value of 
livestock was not an important consideration in the analysis. The 
selection of the rate of discount is also a scale assumption, and the 
value assigned can have a significant effect on the cost benefit ratio, 
resulting in the possibility that benefits are overstated and costs 
understated or vice versa. 
The second type of assumption is more problematic. This group 
involves assumptions about events that may occur, about the period of 
time over which the laboratory will be active and about the benefits 
resulting from ANAHL, and these could be described as substantive 
assumptions. For example, the basis for the selection of forty years as 
the effective life of the laboratory was given by Mr Miller (Acting 
Director, BAE) in answer to a question posed by Mr McVeigh: 
Mr McVeigh: "You have just taken this as a period of forty years for 
the purpose of your exercise, not that because some 
expert from another department said that this is going to 
last forty or fifty years? You have just taken this?" 
Mr Miller: "That is Correct." ^^ 
The assumption made regarding the annual operating costs contains 
both scale and substantive assumptions. The cost under a quiescent disease 
situation is an assumption of scale and was estimated at $2.8 million 
per annum. The cost of operation in an outbreak situation would involve 
substantive assumptions but although the BAE recognised that these costs 
would "increase substantially" during an outbreak "no assumption as to 
the magnitude of the possible increase was made".^^ This means that the 
potential benefits were calculated on the basis of an outbreak of FMD 
but the BAE "considered it unnecessary" ̂ ^ to estimate the true fcosts to 
ANAHL of handling a FMD outbreak. 
Each of the three identified sources of benefits was considered 
separately, and using the eleven assumptions an "attempt [was made] to 
demonstrate the feasibility of obtaining the magnitude of benefits 
during the period from year 11 to 50 which would at least equal the-
magnitude of cost of the NAHL."14 
The first benefit considered was the prevention of substantial 
losses in export sales. According to the discounting assumptions, it 
was calculated that if an outbreak of FMD occurred in year 11, $120 
million of export revenue would have to be saved. If the outbreak 
occurred in year 46, the complete export revenue of about $2,000 million 
would need to be saved. In that case ANAHL would not only have to 
"reduce export losses" but prevent them altogether, an assumption that 
is not made explicit anywhere in the report and indeed one which is 
contrary to any evidence presented in any of the submissions. In the 
CSIRO submission, Dr Pierce stated that ANAHL "cannot keep exotic 
diseases out of Australia; that is not its purpose." ̂ ^ It is also 
interesting that year 46 was chosen in this example, whereas year 50 was 
used in the other examples. If year 50 had been used the benefits would 
need to be $2582 million, that is more than the entire export revenue. 
This argument clearly shows that estimation of benefits and costs over 
50 years was unjustified. 
An alternative calculation in this example shows that if ANAHL 
prevented losses of $10 million each year from years 11 to 50 this would 
equal the investment in the laboratory. 
All these calculations appear to underestimate seriously the costs 
of an outbreak of FMD (Assumption 1 stated that only FMD outbreaks are 
taken into account.) From evidence given at the PWC^^ it was understood 
that an outbreak of FMD in Australia would result in the immediate 
closure of the export market. Çven if some countries continued to trade 
it is certain that Japan and USA would not, and since these two countries 
accounted for two thirds of Australia's beef exports,^^ this would 
represent a loss in exports of over $1300 million per annum. These bans 
would remain in force for 6-12 months after eradication. 
In the Summary and Conclusions, the BAE stated that these examples 
"provide a clear indication of the order of magnitude of benefits which 
might be expected in the event of an exotic disease outbreak occurring." 
However this appears to be a deliberate inversion of the argument. As 
noted previously the calculations are based on the magnitude of benefits 
which would be required to equal the costs of ANAHL with no discussion 
or indication of the feasibility of achieving this result. 
The second example used by the BAE looked at the benefits from a 
reduction in production and slaughter losses that might be considered 
necessary without an ANAHL. Again the calculations were undertaken to 
indicate the order of magnitude of the benefits, in this case the 
reduced slaughter and production losses, required to equal the costs of 
ANAHL. And again the conclusion formed was that these required benefits 
were in fact benefits that might be expected from the operation of ANAHL 
without any examination of the ways in which this might be achieved. 
As well as assuming that ANAHL would have an effect on slaughter 
and production losses, a number of assumptions not included in their 
list of 11 basic assumptions were made. It was assumed that "the sale of 
all livestock and livestock products would be prohibited from the 
affected areas" and that "a proportion of livestock in the affected 
areas would be slaughtered as a disease control measure." ̂ ^ However they 
did not take into account the effect of reduced sales of livestock 
products following the control of a disease outbreak, despite recognising 
that an outbreak would have an impact on this for several years aftfer 
control was established. This means that all the costs were not taken 
into account. 
In order to achieve the required magnitude of benefit it was 
assumed that 0.6% of Australia's livestock was affected by an exotic 
disease outbreak each year and that the presence of ANAHL would reduce 
the effects of the disease to a nine month period each year and that it 
would save half the value of stock slaughtered. However, the CSIRO 
evidence claimed that in the event of an outbreak all stock in the area 
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would be slaughtered "whether showing signs of infection or not". There 
appears to be no reasonable basis for the assumption that ANAHL could 
reduce the time period of the disease from twelve months to nine months 
and the basis for assuming 0.6% disease rate seems to be that it gives 
the correct answer. "It was discovered that if 0.6% of Australia's 
sheep and cattle population is affected by an exotic disease outbreak 
each year, the annual benefits from savings in production and disease 
control slaughterings combined are $10.97 million, which exceed the 
annuity required for the NAHL project to break even."^^ 
As with the first example, these calculations underestimate the 
impact and costs of an FMD outbreak. The CSIRO pointed out that an 
outbreak would involve a total ban on exports^^ therefore production and 
slaughter losses within the affected area cannot be considered iin 
isolation from the economic costs incurred overall. 
The third example considered the benefits resulting from research 
at ANAHL. Although the BAE admitted that "estimates of the monetary 
returns which might be expected from research programs are subject to a 
very large degree of uncertainty" they were able to give the following 
"simple examples": 
"Assume a research breakthrough occurred in year 11. 
If the value of that technological advance added $10 
million or 0.29 per cent to the gross value of $3,384 
million of livestock production in that year, and no 
further increase was achieved through the research 
efforts of the NAHL staff, the project would break 
even in economic terms, i.e., from years 11 to 50 the 
annual gross value of livestock production in 1972-73 
prices would be $3,394 million. 
Alternatively a contribution from research at the 
NAHL to the annual gross value of livestock 
production ($3,384 million) equivalent in value to a 
compound rate of gain of 0.007 per cent per year from 
year 11 to 50 would be required for the project to 
break even. Even if it is assumed that a 10 year 
period elapses between a research discovery and 
adoption of the practice, the necessary compound rate 
of gain in value terms for the project to break even 
rises from 0.007 per cent over 40 years to 0.02 per 
cent from year 21 to 50."^^ 
From these examples, and apparently despite the uncertainty 
surrounding research, the BAE was able to conclude that ANAHL "could be a 
viable proposition as a result of the expected benefits arising from 
research programs alone." ̂ ^ 
No attempt was made to determine the likelihood of a research 
breakthrough which would add $10 million to the value of livestock 
production. Indeed there was no attempt to address the particular area 
at all. Rather this is an abstract calculation which could be used to 
justify the value of a $50 million investment in research in any field. 
« 
The returns on research were apparently considered so self-evident that 
they needed no justification. Indeed one might wonder why the logic of 
the argument was not turned on its head and a case made that the 
increase in the value of production might well be $20 million, so the 
Government should invest $100 million of public money in ANAHL! 
Although the BAE maintained that ANAHL could be viable on the basis 
of research alone, it added that "if these benefits were combined with a 
disease outbreak situation there seems to be little doubt about the 
economic viability of the ANAHL proposal." ̂ ^ This could be taken as 
suggesting that the ANAHL might not be viable on the basis of prevention 
of substantial losses in export revenue, production and slaughtering 
alone, a suggestion that would seem to run counter to the CSIRO's 
economic justification of ANAHL. 
The strength of the conclusion that ANAHL could be viable on the 
basis of research would appear inconsistent with the BAE's admission of 
the very high degree of uncertainty surrounding the benefits of 
research. Furthermore the nature of the research is not discussed. If 
the research is concerned with exotic diseases it is difficult to 
understand how economic advantages can be derived from it, when the 
disease is not present in Australia. In fact if breakthroughs are made 
in the control an eradication of FMD and other countries make use of 
this, Australia's export market could be disadvantaged since its present 
advantage is dependent on its FMD-free status. If on the other hand, the 
research gains are through work on endemic diseases, an interpretation 
made by the Australian National Cattlemen's Council, the possibility 
that these advances could be made in laboratories, other than ANAHL, has 
been overlooked. ' 
The BAE stated in its Summary and Conclusions "if the main 
assumptions in this paper are regarded as reasonable, this would imply 
that the benefits as estimated separately are also reasonable. 
However the basic assumptions and methods of calculation were not 
questioned by the PWC and in fact there were few questions at all. Mr 
Garrick stated: "I have no question, Mr Chairman. I think this sub-
mission asserts that it is a necessary organisation and economically 
v i a b l e . M r Keogh said: "If somebody such as Mr Miller (Acting 
Director, BAE) and others are convinced of the economic viability of it, 
with the CSIRO running it, we are not in disagreement with the 
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question." Once again it is the standing and reputation of 
individuals, rather than the strength of arguments and evidence, which 
became the final basis for decision-making. 
It would seem that when the data are too technical or complex, 
requiring special expertise or at least detailed critical analysis, the 
attention of those assessing the evidence is drawn to the conclusions 
only, and the credibility or legitimacy of the organisation providing 
the evidence is assessed instead. 
As Wynne says: "Expertise and authority can be negotiated by ... 
pretending that decisions are based on sophisticated technical 
forecasting and similar calculations, as opposed to structurally 'given' 
presumptions and g u e s s w o r k . T h i s image of expertise serves to legitimate 
political decisions. 
The power of numbers and scientific method plus the authority of 
the BAE was enough to convince the PWC of the validity on the con-
clusions in the study. However during the questioning period the 
* 
extremely weak basis of the calculations was admitted. Mr Miller 
stated: "The data simply does not exist for the type of analysis that 
would need to be done before one could say professionally that this 
laboratory is definitely an economic proposition. What we have done is 
to, if you like, do some scribbling on the back of a used envelope, 
pulled some figures out of a hat an tried to provide the inter-
departmental committee and this Committee with some figures which will 
help to form a judgment as to whether an insurance policy of this type 
is likely to be b e n e f i c i a l . " N o t only does this statement appear to 
have been overlooked in assessing the evidence but it does not appear to 
be consistent with the authoritative and scientific tone of the BAE 
Report. 
The BAE Report provides a classic illustration of many of the 
problems associated with cost-benefit analysis. All the costs and 
benefits cannot be known, included or measured. The BAE recognised that 
their economic framework "ignores any consideration of the impacts of 
environmental and social welfare" ^^and that "often these aspects may 
not be possible to quantify, but nevertheless have an important bearing 
on a decision to invest in a particular p r o j e c t . I n fact it could be 
argued that it is impossible to ascribe values to costs and benefits at 
all, since it is in the realm of conjecture rather than an objective 
scientific exercise. 
The use of cost-benefit analysis in technology assessment is a 
political act and as Johnston says "produces a spurious mathematical 
precision for very imprecisely known relationships and uses the power of 
numbers to give an appearance of authenticity to decisions."^^ 
In a discussion on the economic analytical frcaaework used, tlie BAE 
claimed that "ideally the economic criteria [of estimated costs, 
estimated benefits and the time period over which the costs and benefits 
are expected to be incurred and received] should be used to compare a 
number-of projects in order to select those with the greatest expected 
net benefits and to determine how a limited supply of capital should'be 
allocated to the projects in the most economically efficient way."^"^ 
Since there were no other alternatives presented for controlling 
outbreaks of exotic disease in Australia, the analysis compared the 
"magnitude of estimated livestock product losses without a NAHL with the 
possible saving of a proportion of those losses if the NAHL was built."^^ 
This is consistent with Wynne's observation that an 
important characteristic of most technology assessment is that usually 
only a single technology is evaluated and the question of relative 
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benefits, "a more overtly political question", is avoided. 
Indeed, it would not be difficult to argue that the cost-benefit 
analysis was framed and conducted with only one possible outcome in mind 
- the provision of a particular kind of authoritative support for the 
construction of ANAHL. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PROPOSED FUNCTIONS OF ANAHL 
THE PROPOSED FUNCTIONS OF ANAHL 
Introduction 
The proposed functions of ANAHL reconinended by Dr Eichhorn after 
his investigation in 1964 were, diagnosis and vaccine testing and 
production. However by 1970, the Commonwealth-States Veterinary 
Committee (CSVC) Working Party, whose terms of reference included an 
investigation of the need for, and the appropriate functions of, i 
maximum security animal health laboratory, had considerably extended and 
elaborated the functions recorranended by Dr Eichhorn. The CSVC 
recommendations which were presented to the Australian Agricultural 
Council (AAC) in 1970, proposed the functions of initial diagnosis, 
continuing diagnosis during an outbreak, and monitoring of strains of-
virus isolated during an outbreak, definitively establishing freedom from 
disease, and training. 
The reconmiendations of the Inter-Departmental Committee, set up by 
the Minister for Health, which were also presented to the AAC in 1970, 
included the functions of diagnosis, training, testing material from 
quarantine stations and performing research on indigenous Australian 
animal virus diseases. So the IDC did not specify vaccine manufacture 
and testing, but did include two new functions for ANAHL, namely 
quarantine testing and research on endemic disease. 
Following the proposals from the CSVC an IDC, the AAC formed a 
Panel, comprising senior representatives of the States under the 
Chairmanship of the Secretary of the Department of Primary Industry. 
This Panel combined and detailed the functions recommended by the CSVC 
and IDC and listed them as: 
i. Establish techniques for the rapid diagnosis of exotic or foreign 
virus diseases; 
ii. Conduct research on indigenous virus infections of animals and 
assist in their control; 
iii. Train field staff in the recognition and presumptive diagnosis of 
virus diseases, and laboratory staff in techniques for the 
isolation and identification of viruses; and . 
iv. Provide highly trained virologists and maximum security laboratory 
and animal accommodation which would be required if an exotic 
disease were introduced into Australia. The provision of such 
staff and facilities would make it possible to: 
a) determine, where it was suspected that a new animal disease 
had reached Australia, whether there was an outbreak of an 
exotic disease or an outbreak of a disease already present; 
b) provide laboratory support for disease control work in the 
field, particularly monitoring the spread of an exotic disease 
and finally establishing freedom from the disease; 
c) provide facilities for the safety and potency testing of any 
vaccine prepared against an exotic disease; 
d) train field and laboratory staff in the recognition and 
methods of control of particular diseases; 
e) test materials collected from animals imported into a high 
security quarantine station for the presence of exotic disease 
agents; and 
V. provide a vaccine production unit capable of producing 200,000 
doses of FMD vaccine per month.^ 
The Chairman of the AAC Panel then invited the Chairman of the 
CSIRO to carry out a feasibility study. A Proposal Evaluation Team 
(PET) was established and its report published in 1972 concluded that it 
was feasible to construct a high security laboratory in Australia and 
that the proposed functions were appropriate. 
At the Parliamentary Public Works Committee Hearing in September 
1974, Dr Snowdon, then Senior Principal Research Scientist, Division of 
Animal Health CSIRO, in his evidence listed the following proposed! 
functions for ANAHL: 
"a. To provide a diagnostic service to support the control and erad-
ication of exotic diseases of livestock should they be introduced 
into Australia and to ensure that livestock imported into an 
offshore quarantine station are free of exotic disease; 
b. To undertake research into indigenous and exotic diseases of 
livestock; 
c. To train laboratory and field personnel in the diagnosis and 
control of exotic diseases; and 
d. To provide facilities for producing 200,000 doses of FMD vaccine 
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per month. 
These functions were adopted in full by the PWC and have provided a 
reference point for subsequent reports and discussions. 
It would appear that following Dr Eichhorn's original recommend-
ations, attempts were made to justify the need for ANAHL in broader 
terms than simply those of coping with an exotic disease emergency. The 
additional functions of research, training and quarantine testing 
provided ANAHL with continuous functions, which added weight to the 
arguments of the need for ANAHL by demonstrating that the facility could 
be usefully employed outside a disease outbreak situation, as well as 
overcoming the potential criticism that ANAHL was unnecessary because 
Australia would never experience an outbreak of serious exotic disease. 
Quarantine testing and research also provided economic arguments aimed 
at convincing primary producers that ANAHL would enable them to improve 
their stock through wider importation and that important work would be 
done on diseases which were currently a problem. ^ 
At the PWC Hearing, Dr Kesteven, then consultant to the Department 
of Agriculture, related the need for ANAHL to the functions of the 
proposed Bureau of Animal Health. The functions of the new BAH were to 
be: 
"1. A national uniform disease recording and trace-back system. 
2. Planning and coordination of animal disease control programmes. 
3. Epidemiology studies relating to necessary field of research. 
4. Determining priorities and planning disease control. 
5. Overseas reporting on animal diseases in Australia."^ 
ANAHL would provide, according to Dr Kesteven, part of the 
"essential back-up" but this is not obvious from the listed functions of 
the BAH, and a specific role for ANAHL was not mentioned in the 
submission which would line up with the proposed functions."^ 
Reports and publications from 1974-1982 referred to the functions 
of ANAHL as those "approved as being appropriate"^ by the PWC but in 
September 1982 the BAH produced a report ANAHL and Exotic Disease 
Control which made no reference to the PWC functions. Instead it 
stated that: "The three broad functions of ANAHL are to: 
Increase Australia's preparedness to diagnose, control and 
eradicate outbreaks of exotic animal diseases. 
Facilitate the safe importation of livestock. 
Facilitate the export of livestock and livestock products." 
So the BAH had gone back to a more generalised statement of 
function using the terms "diagnose, control and eradicate" to encompass 
controversial areas such as training, vaccine production and testing and 
research, but again adding another economic incentive to primary 
i 
producers by emphasising the quarantine aspect. 
The controversy over live virus importation eventually led to the 
ASTEC Inquiry (1962) which re-examined all aspects of ANAHL. In their 
Summary and Recommendations they stated: 
"The main role of the Laboratory should be to provide 
a secure Australian capability for primary diagnosis 
of exotic diseases of animals and for monitoring of 
any outbreak. In association with this function, 
ANAHL should also undertake appropriate research into 
exotic pathogens, with the overall objective of 
increasing Australia's ability for their prompt 
detection, identification and eradication. The role 
of the Laboratory in offering veterinary training, 
and in the production and testing of vaccines is less 
clear-cut, and will depend upon the requirements for 
particular di seases."7 
Evidently, during the eighteen years from 1964-1982 there have been 
various additions, elaborations and shifts of emphasis in the functions 
of ANAHL. In the following section these changes will be examined more 
closely. 
THE DIAGNOSTIC FUNCTION 
From the time of the initial proposal, in 1964, to the estab-
lishment of a maximum security animal disease laboratory, diagnosis has 
always been considered the main function. The 1982 CSIRO Ferguson 
Report stated: "There is no doubt that diagnosis is the prime function of 
ANAHL and cannot be dispensed with." ® . 
Because ANAHL has been characterised as a diagnostic facility, many 
of the arguments justifying the function of diagnosis coincide with 
those justifying the need for ANAHL itself. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, an increasing emphasis was placed on 
the inevitability of exotic diseases entering Australia. Added to this 
were the arguments of the positive benefits to come to primary producers 
from the establishment of ANAHL. These arguments, together with a 
statement of the economic importance of the livestock industry to 
Australia, provided the basis for establishing a need for a maximum 
security diagnostic facility in Australia. 
Primary producer organisations argued that the size of the live-
stock industry justified Australia becoming self-reliant in diagnosing 
exotic diseases: "It is to be deplored that Australia - a country that 
relies so much on livestock production - must use other countries' 
facilities for testing possible major threats to its valuable primary 
industry."^ The basis for this argument is little more than one of 
nationalism - that we are a big country so we should have our own 
facility and not be forced to rely on foreigners. 
As well as these general- arguments, specific arguments which 
focused on the unsatisfactory nature and limitations of the current 
arrangements were put forward to promote the need for ANAHL to perform a 
diagnostic function. At the PWC Hearing it was maintained that overseas 
laboratories may be unreliable, their use could result in costly delays 
or inaccuracies and they could not perform the necessary follow-up 
testing. 
In the Department of Health submission to the PWC Hearing, Mr Gee 
suggested the tenuous nature of these arrangements, but the distinction 
between an initial diagnosis and follow-up testing after an outbreak had 
been confirmed, was blurred. Mr Gee stated: "Arrangements have been 
made with a number of reference laboratories both in Australia and 
overseas for the acceptance of si)ecimens from cases of suspected exotic 
disease in this country. These arrangements are in the nature of a ' 
gentleman's agreement between the Directors and the Quarantine Division 
of the Australian Department of Health. In no sense is there any 
contractual agreement by which any overseas laboratory is committed to 
accepting specimens on a continuing basis from this country." 
Although the word "continuing" is included, the overall sense seems 
to suggest that these overseas laboratories are unreliable even for 
initial diagnosis. Apparently this was the interpretation Senator 
Melzer (PWC member) placed on it when he asked, "On the face of it, with 
these gentlemen's agreements we could finish up with all those doors 
closed in our face?" Mr Gee: "Yes." ^^ 
However, during questioning, Dr Pierce of the CSIRO stated, "they 
(Pirbright) are a world reference centre ... their responsibility is to 
establish a diagnosis." ^^ In an article in Rural Research, the CSIRO 
stated, "reference laboratories, whether or not funded by the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations are only committed to a 
primary diagnosis." ^^ 
Mr Gee, in his evidence, went on to state: "Contact with some of 
these laboratories is infrequent and there is always the possibility 
that cooperation may be affected by changing circumstances of, e.g., 
politics, war or communications."^"^ 
To substantiate his claim that overseas laboratories may be^ 
unreliable, Mr Gee pointed out that in a routine reconfirmation of 
cooperation only six of the ten cooperating laboratories replied. 
Although a list of the laboratories concerned was contained in Appendix 
B it was not made explicit in the submission itself, that, included in 
the four who did not reply were Plum Island and the Wellcome Research 
Laboratory, England. During questioning Mr Gee admitted that "We ... 
have a very close contact with the United States in Plum Island" and 
that "fortunately we have received confirmatory replies from the most 
important ones." ^^ 
The two other laboratories which did not reply were The Veterinary 
and Research Laboratory Dokki, United Arab Republic, a world reference 
centre for Sheep Pox, and the Central Veterinary Institute, Budapest, 
Hungary, a world reference centre for Dourine. Perhaps the Department 
of Health's fears of disruption due to politics or war were justified in 
these cases, but it is important to note that neither of these diseases 
is ranked as a high priority danger to Australia. ̂ ^ 
At the ANAHL Forum, Dr Brown (Deputy Director Pirbright) was asked 
if there was "any possibility of a situation, maybe due to a government 
of a different persuasion or to a change of policy by the management of 
Pirbright, which may result in the delay of testing or the refusal to 
handle material from Australia for the pur|K)se of identifying a suspec-
ted outbreak." Dr Brown answered: "I think ... that it (Pirbright) has 
been the most philanthropic organisation in the scientific world over 
the last twenty-five years in the field of virus diagnosis. Pirbright 
tries to help anybody who seeks help. When the Australian authorities 
sought help in 1979 they got a lot."^^ 
Dr Snowdon, in the CSIRO Submission, also pointed out the 
shortcomings of relying on overseas laboratories: "The procedures 
required to obtain diagnoses in overseas laboratories are accompanied by 
uncertainties and delays. For instance, material may be lost in 
transit, or exposed to conditions which could destroy disease agents 
which it may contain, and unless Australian authorities are in constant 
contact with the overseas laboratories that have agreed to carry out the 
diagnostic tests, there can be misunderstandings resulting in failure to 
obtain a diagnosis."^® 
However during cross-examination Dr Snowdon replied that Pirbright 
would give a diagnosis, "possibly within two or three to four hours" of 
receipt of the sample although, "if they have to grow it up in tissue 
culture, which is the second procedure, I would say that would take 48 
hours, but possibly 24 if everything works well."^^ 
This time-frame was confirmed by the events at Humpty Doo, Northern 
Territory, where on Friday 26 May 1983, two pigs were suspected of 
having a vesicular disease. These animals were examined by a Northern 
Territory pathologist on Saturday 27 May and were subsequently killed 
and autopsied. Tissue samples were then sent to Pirbright and these 
arrived Sunday 29 May and testing commenced immediately. By Monday 30 
May, the Mi nister for Primary Industry, John Kerin, was able to announce 
that preliminary tests were negative and that a final clearance should 
be available within two to three days.^^ 
Other reasons were also given for avoiding reliance on overseas 
laboratories. Dr Snowdon argued: "No overseas laboratory could be 
expected to undertake the large number of tests required during the 
control and eradication of an exotic disease. 
* 
This claim was also made by Dr Pierce in his evidence: "Overseas 
laboratories could not be expected to carry out tests on anything like 
the scale that may be required" and, he continued: "Moreover, the need to 
send material continually overseas, for diagnosis would severely limit 
the speed and effectiveness of the many decisions that would have to be 
made during the course of an eradication campaign. 
The matter of whether overseas laboratories would be prepared to 
carry out follow-up testing was questioned by Mr Kelly of the PWC. Dr 
Pierce replied, "whether the negotiations have been carried out, whether 
the questions have been asked as to how many tests they would be 
prepared to carry out, I would rather you questioned the Department of 
Health on that. All I know is that we requested that they confirm an 
initial tentative diagnosis."^"^ 
When the hearing resumed the following day Dr Pierce offered the 
following additional information: 
"I spoke to the Director (of Pirbright), Dr John 
Brooksby, by telephone last night and he said simply, 
no. They have not got available facilities for 
carrying out expensive testing for overseas 
countries, nor did they consider this their respons-
ibility. The Director could not make nor could he 
hold such facilities for immediate readiness for such 
an emergency. I asked him whether he would do so if 
Australia were prepared to pay for the service. He 
again said. No. He pointed out that samples submit-
ted for the initial confirmatory diagnosis, which is 
their responsibility of course, have to be accom-
panied by very detailed documentation. This was the 
arrangement under which they agreed to carry out this 
service and to accept the samples. He considered 
that it would be unreasonable to demand and imprac-
tical to provide such documentation for a larger 
number of samples which would be required for testing 
in order to monitor a control and eradication 
program. His further advice was that such a proce-
dure, using a laboratory that is 12,000 miles away 
from the outbreak, was not a practical approach to * 
the backing required by those carrying out the con-
trol and eradication program in the field. There 
would inevitably be delays which he felt would be 
unacceptable."25 
The next stage of the argument presented to the PWC combined the 
limitation of overseas laboratories with,economic considerations. Dr 
Pierce stated: 
"As mentioned previously, much of our overseas 
trade in meat and livestock products would cease 
overnight if Australia had an outbreak of FMD. In the 
absence of any other evidence, those nations consti-
tuting our major overseas market for meat would 
normally require that Australia remain free of FMD 
for some time after a declaration of successful 
eradication and before allowing a resumption of meat 
imports. On the other hand, if Australia had diag-
nostic facilities, these countries might be expected 
to reduce this period considerably as the result of 
the provision of laboratory diagnostic tests showing 
negative results. A reduction in lost trading time 
of even a few months could represent a gain of 
million of dollars from agricultural exports." ^^ 
This argument represented a considerable jump in reasoning and no 
evidence was given to substantiate the claim that ANAHL could reduce the 
time period of export bans. However its effectiveness was evident from 
this statement in the Australian National Cattlemen's Council 
submission: "The presence of the ANAHL would mean that in the event of 
an outbreak of exotic disease, an eradication program would commence 
more rapidly than if no such laboratory was available, and it was 
necessary to rely on overseas facilities. Each month's delay in having 
Australia declared free after such an outbreak, is worth approximately 
$5.5 million in beef exports alone." 
Yet in the CSIRO submission, Dr Pierce stated: "... measures to 
contain the spread of the disease would be taken at the site of a 
suggested outbreak before a positive diagnosis was obtained,"^®and, in a 
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later section headed "Eradication Procedures for FMD", he stated that in 
the event of an outbreak of FMD there would be, "total and immediate 
eradication by the slaughter of all infected and in contact stock whether 
showing signs of infection or not."29 This would indicate that 
eradication would be undertaken immediately, on the basis of clinical 
symptoms alone without waiting for laboratory confirmation, therefore 
there would be no advantage in respect of the time period involved, from 
the presence of ANAHL. Similarly, there appears no basis for the CSIRO 
argument that ANAHL would reduce the time of a trading ban. Trading 
partners would most likely require independent confirmation of freedom 
from disease and the time delay involved in having confirmation from 
Pirbright could be measured in hours or days and not months as suggested 
by the CSIRO. 
The same arguments that were used at the PWC Hearing in 1974 to 
demonstrate the disadvantages of relying on overseas laboratories were 
used by the Australian Bureau of Animal Health in 1982: "Specimens may 
be delayed, rendered useless or lost in transit. Further delays may 
occur after the samples reach the laboratory if it is hard-pressed and 
cannot allot them priority ... Laboratories may become unsuitable for 
political reasons or because they lose key staff, or reorder their own 
priorities. We cannot be certain that any laboratory will divert 
resources to carry out the necessary follow-up testing beyond the pre-
liminary examination." And in the conclusion to the BAH Report 
(ANAHL and Exotic Disease Control 82) the claim was made that (ANAHL) 
"will help to ensure that our vital domestic and export markets are 
safeguarded and are disrupted as little as possible." ̂ ^ 
At the ANAHL Forum Dr Southcott (Assistant Chief, Division o^ 
Animal Health, CSIRO) maintained that ANAHL, "will follow rather than lead in 
making an initial diagnosis and is unlikely to influence the outcome."^^ 
He also stated that having a high security laboratory would not mean 
that the disease would be detected earlier or that the outbreaks would 
be smaller and brought under control more rapidly. As he pointed out, 
Britain experienced its largest outbreak of FMD in 1967 despite its 
maximum security laboratory at Pirbright, its considerable experience in 
FMD eradication campaigns and despite having about five times as many 
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vets as Australia and only about one-fifth of our susceptible livestock. 
In its promotional booklet "How would we cope with an outbreak of 
FMD", the CSIRO stated that during the 1982 Danish FMD outbreak, the 
Danish high-security laboratory "was regarded as a vital resource in the 
eradication program" and that it "came up with their primary diagnosis 34 
within eighteen hours of receiving the first specimen." However it 
failed to mention that initially, on the basis of a field diagnosis, the 
animals were thought to be suffering from mucosal disease. This 
misdiagnosis resulted in the loss of four-five days before a diagnosis 
of FMD was established, and facilitated the spread of the disease to 
twenty-two properties before containment.^^ 
This incident highlighted the importance of accurate field 
diagnosis and recognition of symptoms by primary producers themselves. 
Mr Gee has continually stressed the importance of early diagnosis. "The 
essence of containment of an introduced exotic disease is early 
diagnosis" 36 and "of vital importance in any control and eradication 
campaign is the early detection and diagnosis of the exotic disease." ̂ ^ 
But this argument would seem to point to the need for the training 
i 
or primary producers and veterinarians in the recognition of exotic 
diseases rather than the need for a diagnostic laboratory. The greatest 
potential time loss is likely to be in the initial response of the 
farmer and veterinary officer. 
The BAH report on the Humpty Doo incident in the Northern 
Territory stated that the lesions on the suspect pigs were estimated' to 
be approximately one to two weeks old.^® The difference in time between 
sending samples to Geelong or Pirbright is small in comparison to this 
one to two week delay in the initial recognition. 
So although it has been claimed that ANAHL will reduce the time 
taken to obtain a diagnosis, it may in fact reduce minimally only one 
part of a chain of events, all filled with uncertainty. 
The Australian National Cattlemen's Council submission to the PWC 
stated, "The ANAHL is essential if Australia is to be in a position to 
eradicate any exotic diseases that may be introduced at any time in the 
39 
future." And the Department of Northern Development stated in its 
submission to the PWC that "should an exotic disease such as FMD be 
introduced into Australia, its successful control and eradication could 40 
only be achieved with the support of a laboratory such as ANAHL". It 
should be noted that there were no veterinary scientists in the 
Department; it was admitted during questioning that the Department 
relied on scientific advice given by the Department of Health and the 
41 
CSIRO. But as Dr Southcott pointed out, Australia had been successful 
in the past in eradicating exotic diseases and the last outbreak of FMD 
in the US in 1929 was eradicated before the existence of Plum Island 
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Animal Disease Centre. 
It would seem that the arguments used to justify ANAHL's diagnostic 
function moved from demonstrating the inadequacies of the present 
arrangements, to making claims that ANAHL could provide an "insurance 
against the day an outbreak of an exotic disease occurs." From the 
evidence given and from the experiences of other countries with 
diagnostic facilities, there seems to be little support for this claim. 
Although the arguments of the CSIRO and Department of Health were 
aimed at demonstrating the need for Australia to undertake its own 
diagnostic work, they failed to address the question of whether or not 
a maximum-security facility was essential for this work. Dr Gibbs at the 
ANAHL Forum raised this question an suggested that, "it does not take an 44 
enormous lab of this sort to do simple diagnosis". But as the CSIRO 
Ferguson Report stated: "In any case, the capital has been spent and it 
is not recoverable."^^ 
At the end of the CSIRO evidence to the PWC, Mr Kelly (PWC Member) 
expressed surprise that they had not "made more of the additional value 
of the quarantine station that this laboratory makes possible". He 
explained that "one of the interesting aspects of the quarantine hearing 
(Mr Kelly was on the committee which reviewed the proposal for the 
Quarantine Station in 1973) was that I thought Dr Gee prepared the 
ground for this laboratory particularly competently when he mentioned 
that our ability to import stock from the more 'dirty' areas was limited 
because we did not have what we called then a maximum security labora-
tory." ̂ ^ 
Although the Department of Health submission dealt with ANAHL's 
role in testing quarantine animals and this function was included in the 
PWC Report as part of the diagnostic function of ANAHL, it was not used 
* 
as a major argument to promote diagnosis at ANAHL. Yet by 1982 in the 
BAH Report a shift in emphasis had occurred and "the three broad 
functions of ANAHL" were listed as 
increase Australia's preparedness to diagnose, control and 
eradicate outbreaks of exotic animal diseases 
facilitate the safe importation of livestock 
facilitate the export of livestock and livestock products.^^ 
There are three possible explanations for this new emphasis on 
quarantine testing. First, although the proposal for the establishment 
of a maximum security quarantine station went before the PWC in 1973, 
construction did not commence until September 1978 and the facility was 
not opened until November 1981. But even before its opening, 
questioning of its need and functions occurred. In April 1981, 
Professor B. Morris stated at the Annual Conference of the Cattle 
Council of Australia that the Cocos Island Quarantine Station was 
"clearly fifty years too late" and was already obsolete because new 
technology meant that genetic material could be introduced as ova and 
48 sperm rather than importing whole animals. 
The proponents of the quarantine station argued that it could only 
reach its full potential of ANAHL undertook diagnostic t e s t i n g . O n the 
other hand quarantine testing provided another justification for ANAHL 
involving a function outside a disease outbreak situation which would 
result in continual work. So each facility was used to justify the 
other. 
Secondly, it provided additional economic arguments to primary 
producers who were told they would be able to improve the genetic 
material of their stock and hence improve their productivity. * 
Thirdly, it could be suggested that the close linking of ANAHL to 
the quarantine station might have been part of a political move to 
expedite the transfer of quarantine matters from the Department of 
Health to the BAH. In the Department of Agriculture submission to the 
PWC, Dr Kesteven stated that the BAH, which was to be established in 
December 1974, would be responsible for "all Australian Government 
Animal Health Services except Animal Quarantine, which will be con-
sidered at a later date."^° Mr Gee, in his capacity as Director of BAH, 
stated in 1975 "By agreement between the two Departments, all veterinary 
responsibilities other than direct import quarantine are to be trans-
ferred during this year from the Department of Health to the Bureau. 
In the 1982 Report of the Northern Australian Development Seminar, Mr 
Gee stated "there is an anomaly that responsiblity for animal quarantine 
rests with the Minister for Health, instead of the Minister for Primary 
Industry ... This anomaly is under review following recommendations made 
by Senate Inquiry into the Adequacy of Q u a r a n t i n e . T h i s statement 
would suggest that Mr Gee considered that Dr Kesteven's "later date" had 
arrived. 
Although the ASTEC Report recognised that "a specific objective 
proposed for ANAHL is to provide diagnostic services in support of 
Australia's animal quarantine station",^^ it did not include this in its 
list of recommended functions and in fact made no comment on the appro-
priateness or desirability of this function. ASTEC did, however, 
recognise that the "main role of the Laboratory should be to provide a 
secure Australian capability for primary diagnosis of exotic diseases of 
animals and for monitoring of any outbreak. 
Although the evidence at the PWC demonstrated a need for Australia 
to perform its own follow-up testing after an outbreak had been 
confirmed, it did not show a need for ANAHL to undertake the initial 
diagnosis. Denmark, during the 1982 outbreak, sent its first and last 
samples to Pirbright for confirmation despite having is own diagnosti-c 
facilities. It has also been suggested that trading partners would 
require independent confirmation of eradication from a world reference 
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laboratory before the resumption of trade. 
The arguments that the existence of ANAHL will mean that outbreaks 
are diagnosed earlier and eradicated faster do not appear to be 
supported by the evidence. 
The current questioning of the usefulness, viability and safety of 
the Cocos Islands quarantine station also brings into question the 
proposed diagnostic function of ANAHL in relation to the importing of 
livestock. ^^ 
At the PWC Hearing, Dr Snowdon stated: "the only alternative to 
one Australian laboratory such as proposed for ANAHL, is to provide 
separate facilities in each of the States." However, he dismissed this 
on the basis.of cost and duplication of services and no other altern-
ative was put forward.^^ More recently. Professor B. Morris and Dr G. 
Laver of the Australian National University, among others, have 
suggested that mobile facilities for on-farm diagnosis should be 
developed and the Australian Academy of Science is currently studying 
this possibility. 
The arguments put forward at the PWC Hearing justifying a 
diagnostic function can be summarised as follows: 
1. Australia needs a diagnostic facility to perform follow-up testing 
after an outbreak has been confirmed. ; 
It would appear that the arguments presented substantiated 
this claim; overseas laboratories may not be available to perform 
follow-up testing on the scale required and even if they were, it 
would not be a convenient or efficient way to conduct an 
eradication campaign. However these arguments do not demonstrate 
that ANAHL is the only way, or even the best way, of performing 
this task. It could be argued that once an outbreak has occurred, 
the maximum security facilities offered by ANAHL are superfluous. 
Also the establishment of a centralised facility imposes certain 
constraints and current thinking appears to favour a decentralised 
approach using on-site testing facilities. 
2. The argument that overseas laboratories could not be relied upon to 
perform follow-up testing was then extended to suggest that overseas 
laboratories could not be relied upon to perform initial testing. 
This would seem an unwarranted extension from the evidence given. 
3. The suggestion that the presence of ANAHL could "protect" 
Australia's livestock industry represents a further extension of 
the arguments. Although the CSIRO made the disclaimer that ANAHL 
"cannot keep exotic disease out of Australia",^^ this appeared to be 
overlooked often, and "protect" was used to mean "prevent the 
consequences of an outbreak". At other times it was used as meaning 
"reduce the impact of an outbreak" but there was no evidence given 
to substantiate the claim that laboratory diagnosis would have any 
impact on the duration of an outbreak. The usefulness of this 
argument would appear to be in providing an economic incentive, 
albeit an erroneous one. 
i 
4. The final argument used to promote the function of diagnosis was 
again an economic argument. ANAHL is necessary, it has been 
argued, to test livestock imported through the Cocos Island 
Quarantine Station; this would allow primary producers to improve 
their stock and their economic viability. The safety and economic 
viability of such a scheme is currently being questioned. 
It is interesting to note that this argument has moved away 
from the original concept of diagnosis in the event of an outbreak, 
to providing a justification for diagnosis on a continuing basis. 
Thus the diagnostic function has been given a wider meaning, 
with a new emphasis on the quarantine aspect, at a time when the 
necessity for a maximum security facility for diagnosis of an 
outbreak was being questioned. 
It would appear that Australia needs diagnostic facilities to 
assist in the management of disease outbreaks in Australia. However it 
has not been demonstrated that ANAHL is the only, or the best way of 
achieving this, nor do the economic arguments appear justified. 
TRAINING FUNCTION 
The training function has been promoted as enhancing the diagnostic 
function of the laboratory and as a factor in accelerating the 
eradication of the disease. Yet it could be argued that the extension 
of the functions of ANAHL to include training provides additional 
justification for the establishment of ANAHL by showing that ANAHL "can 
be really usefully functioning at all times and not just when there are 
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outbreaks". As Dr Pierce said during questioning at the PWC Hearing, "I 
think it is very important for you to understand that this laboratory is 
not a white elephant between the times when there are outbreaks." ̂ ^ 
Dr Eichhorn's Report (1964) only recommended that Australia 
establish a maximum-security laboratory for diagnosis and vaccine 
production, but the CSVC Report (1970) included training as a function 
and the IDC Report (1970) specified training for veterinarians. 
Although the Panel formed by the AAC in August 1970 is said to have 
combined the recommendations of the CSVC and IDC, they, in fact, 
extended and detailed training to include the training of "field staff 
in the recognition and presumptive diagnosis of virus diseases and 
laboratory staff in techniques for the isolation and identification of 
C O 
viruses." 
Although there was no mention of the training function in the 1973 
CSIRO Report ^^the CSIRO submission to the PWC in 1974, following the 
AAC Panel definition of training function, stated: 
"The facilities provided by the ANAHL and the staff 
skilled in virological diagnostic techniques will 
enable field staff from State and Australian 
Government Departments to be trained in the 
recognition and presumptive diagnosis of exotic virus 
diseases and their differentiation from endemic virus 
diseases. It will also provide training for 
laboratory staff in the identification of animal 
viruses. Training would also be given regarding some 
aspects of the contairmient, control and eradication 
of exotic diseases." 
So training now included two aspects: the training in field 
diagnosis and methods of control, and the training of laboratory staff 
in the recognition of viruses. 
The training of laboratory staff has not attracted a lot of * 
attention or comment. The ASTEC Report briefly refers to training of 
laboratory staff. It recognised that 
"prompt and accurate diagnosis of a suspected exotic 
disease can greatly facilitate control and 
eradication. Such diagnosis requires the 
availability of trained laboratory staff able to 
manipulate the initial samples to best advantage, and 
implies prior experience with the diagnostic tests to 
be used"o5 
but maintained that this experience could be gained "through work in 
overseas laboratories".^^ The Report went on to say that the "cost of 
sending Australians overseas to gain experience in ... laboratory 
manipulation ... is minor compared with the benefits of this course of 
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action . 
A question which might be asked is why, if ANAHL "Will be 
constantly populated by the best research scientists that we can attract 
on a world basis"^^ and "absolutely first class virologists"^^ will be 
working there, it would be necessary to train them in animal virus 
identification. 
Mr Gee extended the notion of training laboratory staff of ANAHL to 
training laboratory staff of State diagnostic laboratories. He saw this 
as "essential in case specimens from animals with exotic diseases are 
first submitted to a State laboratory with no intimation that anything 
out of the ordinary was suspected.However, all the reports on ANAHL 
and exotic disease management stress that in a suspected outbreak all 
samples would be sent to ANAHL, and that, in fact, ANAHL would be the only 
place in Australia capable of diagnosing FMD; thus the training of 
State laboratory staff may be of dubious relevance. 
The arguments used for the justification of the training function 
i 
of ANAHL tend to concentrate on field training following the line of the 
PWC Report that "the essence of successful containment of an outbreak of 
exotic disease is early recognition in the field."^^ 
In an address to the Rural Press Club in Brisbane in August 1983, 
Dr Snowdon stated: 
"The rapid detection of an exotic disease in the 
field is dependent on its early recognition by field 
officers ... This does not eliminate, of course, the 
need for the stockowner to recognise that a disease 
is occurring in the first place. Thus the chances of 
early recognition will depend on the alertness and 
clinical acumen of these officers, ... One of the 
roles of ANAHL is to train field officers in the y2 
early recognition of exotic diseases including FMD." 
Although Dr Snowdon acknowledged that stockowners play a part in 
the recognition of diseases they are not included in the training 
programmes at ANAHL. 
The Ferguson Report stated 
"The Committee agrees that audiovisual and other 
training aids have their place. They are 
particularly useful for educating the wider audience, 
including farmers, but they are not a complete 
substitute for trailing that involves the study of 
diseased animals." 
So it would appear that the CSIRO viewed the diagnostic role of the 
veterinary officer as being of greater importance and requiring more 
extensive training than the role of the farmer in alerting them to the 
disease. 
A contrary view was expressed by Dr Gibson (President, British 
Veterinary Association). He claimed "no amount of research can make up 
for a quick diagnosis by the man on the land, who is really the key to 
any disease prevention. 
Dr Gibson's view was supported by Mr K. A. Doyle, Assistant 
Director General, Animal Quarantine, Department of Health, at the ANAHL 
Forum. He stated: 
"I think what we ought to be doing, in fact it is 
really amazing that we are not doing it now, is 
educating farmers in the recognition of FMD and other 
vesicular diseases. This ought to be done as a 
matter of urgency."'^ 
An important distinction which needs to be drawn, is between 
training which requires maximum security facilities and other training 
methods. 
At the PWC Hearing Dr Snowdon stated: 
"The training of field staff in the recognition and 
presumptive diagnosis of exotic diseases requires 
maximum security animal accommodation where animals 
can be infected and examined by field staff and a 
presumptive diagnosis, based on clinical features 
given. This work can only be undertaken in maximum 
security facilities."'° 
An alternative not recognised by Dr Snowdon in this statement is 
the training which does not rely on the infection of live animals with 
the virus and which, therefore, does not require a laboratory such as 
ANAHL. The current training methods used in Australia include lectures, 
written information, audiovisuals as well as attendance at overseas 
outbreaks and overseas training courses by selected personnel. 
Opponents of training using live virus to infect animals have 
argued that, not only do audiovisuals, etc., provide an adequate 
alternative, but in some ways are superior even leaving aside 
consideration of the risk factor involved in the infection of large 
numbers of animals and the participation of large numbers of observers. 
At the ANAHL Forum Professor Blood (Melbourne University) 
stated: "I am involved in training ... videotape has all the advantages 
... I would suggest to you that it is better than being in the animal 
room." ^^ Good audiovisuals, he claimed can cover the whole spectrum and 
"it is much better to have a whole galaxy of visual aids showing all the 
signs, all the lesions that may appear from the very least to the very 
worst, than it is to see one microcosm of it in the rather artificial 
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circumstances of a laboratory." He also pointed out that a 
"disadvantage of looking at a disease in an ANAHL cubicle is that you do 
not see the herd. You do not see the epidemiology of the disease. I 79 
think the epidemiology is probably more important than the rest." 
Continuing with his evidence to the PWC, Dr Snowdon claimed "the 
only alternative [to undertaking a training programme at ANAHL] is to 80 
have personnel trained in overseas laboratories." The next step in 
his argument was to show that this was an unsatisfactory alternative, an 
argument that was also used for promoting the need for ANAHL to under-
take diagnosis and vaccine production. Dr Snowdon maintained 
"the opportunities for training overseas are limited, 
whereas constant training of most field veterinarians 
in the recognition of exotic diseases is required. 
This could only be undertaken, on the scale required, 
in an Ai^tralian maximum security laboratory such as 
ANAHL."^^ 
So in 1974 at the PWC Hearing, the CSIRO maintained that the only 
alternative to training veterinarians at ANAHL was to train them in 
overseas laboratories. This alternative was considered unsuitable 
because only a few could attend each year. 
However in its April 1982 Report, the CSIRO recognised the use of 
overseas outbreaks as another means of training but saw cost and the 
limited disease range as disadvantages: 
"Another method of training is to send officers 
overseas to assist in disease control program. This 
has limitations because officers do not see the full i 
range of diseases with which they could be confronted 
in Australia. It is also expensivaoconsidering the 
number of officers to be trained." 
Mr Gee in the BAH Report maintained that: "the best training is to 
have people participate in major exotic disease outbreaks" but the 
limitation he saw was that "such training has to be restricted to a few 
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key people." But the. CSIRO Ferguson Report stated: 
"The argument that first-hand experience in FMD 
outbreak situations is one of the best forms of 
training is invalid. While opportunistic use might 
be made of outbreaks in some situations, it would 
rarely be feasible to do so in neighbouring countries 
such as Burma or Thailand. Moreover, every visit to 
an outbreak or to a farm in an affected country 
entails some risk of bringing the disease back to 
Australia - a risk greater, in the Committee's view, 
than the possibility of escape through training ĝ ^ 
courses in the totally-controlled situation in ANAHL." 
The Ferguson Report relied heavily on Mr Doyle's submission to the 
Review Committee to support the case for training at ANAHL. Mr Doyle is 
quoted as saying: "audiovisuals alone do not provide the insight 
into the diseases that handling infected animals does. ... Reliance on 
other countries for this type of training, ... is most unwise, as 
85 
courses are unlikely to be available on a regular basis in the future." 
However at the ANAHL Forum, Mr Doyle concluded his speech by saying: 
"The veterinary knowledge and skill of being able to 
make at least some sort of tentative clinical 
diagnosis and ensuring that all the right actions are 
taken is, of course, of very great importance. I 
think first class lectures appropriately illustrated 
with still and movie films developed overseas will be 
an excellent way of educating Australia's large field 
veterinary force. Selected staff from ANAHL and 
State Departments would continue to be sent overseas 
to work in FMD outbreaks and gain first hand 
experience. Mr Gee has always emphasised the very 
great importance of that particular experience. This 
experience should be obtained both in the field and 
in the laboratory and where possible from attending 
courses in vesicular disggse diagnosis conducted from ; 
time to time overseas." 
So it would seem that those advocating a training function, whilst 
agreeing on the basis of the need for this function, i.e., facilitating 
an early diagnosis, differ in their evaluation and criticism of possible 
al ternatives. 
The Australian National Cattlemen's Council submission to the PWC 
recognised training as a valid function of ANAHL but interpreted its 
value as training personnel in other countries: "The presence of the 
ANAHL would greatly speed up the rate at which such diseases [i.e. FMD] 
could be eradicated from countries that have close geographical 
proximity to Australia, as it would be possible to train laboratory 
staff and veterinarians from these countries in methods of producing 
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vaccines and in general disease control." 
The ASTEC Report presented the various arguments for and against 
the various training methods. These arguments can be summarised as: 
Overseas Outbreaks . difficult to arrange 
. danger of bringing back disease 
. may have different hosts, symptoms and method 
of spread to Australia. 
Overseas Courses . few places 
. costly 
. laboratory symptoms may differ from symptoms in 
the field 
. does not give "herd picture' 
. able to follow the development of the disease. 
Audio Visuals . No "hands-on" experience 
. able to show a wide range of clinical symptoms 
In different host species at one session. 
The ASTEC Committee also recognised the risks involved concluding 
that "training courses, using deliberately infected livestock, probably 
represent the greatest challenge to the microbiological security of 
ANAHL." 
Whilst accepting the need for training, the ASTEC Committee 
concluded that "the benefits should be carefully weighed against the 
risks before a decision is taken whether to infect livestock for 
oq 
training purposes." 
It could be argued that a training function was proposed in order to 
add weight to the argument for the establishment of ANAHL, rather than in 
response to a clearly defined need. Although training was not included 
in the original proposal for the establishment of a maximum security 
animal health laboratory, by the time the proposal went before the PWC, 
the training function had been established and elaborated. 
The arguments presented, showing the importance of early diagnosis 
appear valid and are confirmed by overseas experience where misdiagnoses 
have resulted in delays and spread of outbreaks. However these 
arguments do not necessarily demonstrate a need for ANAHL to undertake 
this training. 
The safety and wisdom of infecting large numbers of animals 
with exotic diseases, and the involvement of large numbers of people 
unskilled in methods of microbiological security was not questioned 
by the PWC. Furthermore, the role of the primary producer as the first 
line of defence was overlooked, with training directed at veterinary 
officers only. 
In their zeal to justify training at ANAHL as a valid function and 
to demonstrate the inadequacies of any alternatives, the proponents of 
the training function tended to produce conflicting and contradictory 
arguments. 
It would seem that training was included as a function of ANAHL to 
provide an on-going activity for the facility outside a disease outbreak 
situation. Thus training helps to justify the cost of ANAHL by showing 
that it will be usefully functioning all the time. The claim that this 
training will result in earlier, more accurate diagnosis, thus 
accelerating an eradication programme, which would mean reduced economic 
losses, is also used to provide a further economic justification for 
training at ANAHL. 
RESEARCH FUNCTION 
In overseas animal disease laboratories such as Plum Island and 
Pirbright, research constitutes about 75% of their effort. Although the 
prime function of ANAHL was to be diagnosis, research had been 
recognised as a major part of ANAHL's operation and it was on this basis 
that the CSIRO was invited to manage and staff ANAHL.^^ 
The arguments promoting research at ANAHL, like the arguments for 
training, add weight to the justification for ANAHL since the facility 
can be seen to be functioning between outbreak situations. 
Although research had been accepted as a valid function for ANAHL 
by the PWC, more recently there has been a questioning of what consti-
tutes appropriate research. As a result of this questioning a change 
has been made in the type of research to be undertaken at ANAHL. This 
change was not based on scientific arguments, but on the economic 
grounds that the operating costs of ANAHL were such that only research 
requiring maximum-security facilities should be undertaken there, and 
because it was feared that the funding of other animal disease research 
laboratories in Australia would be adversely affected. 
The first mention of a research function came in the IDC Report of 
1970 where it was recommended that research work on indigenous virus 
diseases be undertaken. This recommendation was included in the AAC 
Panel list of functions. In the CSIRO submission to the PWC, Dr Pierce 
argued that ANAHL needed to engage in research in order to better 
perform its diagnostic function. 
"The only satisfactory way of ensuring the continuing 
presence of a team of the calibre required is for the 
laboratory to have a continuous involvement in 
relevant research in this and closely related fields. 
In this way, the laboratory, which would represent a 
considerable capital investment, would be effectively 
used at all times and would also be in a state of 
readiness at all times for an emergency." 
Dr Snowdon in his evidence to the PWC stated that it is intended 
that ANAHL should "undertake research into indigenous and exotic 
diseases of livestock". ^^ He later expanded this point. "There are two 
main reasons for carrying out research into endemic virus diseases? 
within ANAHL. The first is to develop techniques for the rapid differ-
entiation of endemic and exotic diseases ... The second reason for 
carrying out research into endemic diseases is to ensure that the staff 
is at a high state of preparedness when called upon during an outbreak 
of an exotic disease. To keep morale high staff must be actively 
participating in research programs and before exotic diseases are intro-
duced these programs are best undertaken with endemic diseases where 
results can be directly applied within A u s t r a l i a . I n these 
arguments there appears to be a confusion between the research role and 
diagnostic role and the assumption is made that a good diagnostician 
will also be a good research scientist. Dr Kesteven (former Consultant 
to the Department of Agriculture) pointed out that "successful planning 
for the control of disease must be done by specialists in this field, 
which is a very different discipline from academic research; the 
experienced disease control expert draws on the results of academic 
Qd 
research and puts them into practical use."^ 
The Australian National Cattleman's Council in their submission to the 
PWC urged that research be carried out on endemic diseases and they even 
specified particular diseases of interest: 
"It is understood that a team of highly qualified 
virologists will be maintained at the laboratory and 
... they will be in a position to undertake research 
into a number of endemic diseases of significance to 
the cattle industry. The most important of these is 
ephermeral fever, that has been present in Australia 
for only a few years yet has been responsible for 
production losses, especially in Northern Australia. 
It is also understood that Murray Valley 
encephalitis, that has recently been responsible for 
a number of deaths in humans in Australia, could be 
carried by domestic animals and thus it will be in 
the national interest for research to be undertaken 
on this disease with the idea of seeking an * 
appropriate vaccine. 
It is understood that cost-benefit studies have 
been undertaken by the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, demonstrating that the capital cost of the 
laboratory together with the annual operating costs 
can be more than justified in the terms qf the 
eradication of endemic viral diseases." ̂ ^ 
The PWC Report concluded that ANAHL, "Will undertake a continuing-
research program into indigenous and exotic diseases of livestock to 
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ensure that the staff are fully trained to meet any emergency." 
The first deviation from the PWC statement is contained in the 
CSIRO Report Live Exotic Disease Agents ^ ANAHL. (The 1981 CSIRO 
publication ANAHL: A Summary of the History of the ANAHL, Its 
Development and Future Operation lists the functions of ANAHL exactly 
as given by the PWC.) Whilst stating that "the following functions were 
approved as being appropriate for ANAHL by the PWC" the wording of the 
research function was changed to "undertake research into those animal 
diseases requiring laboratory facilities of high microbiological 
security with emphasis to be given to exotic diseases which are a 
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potential danger to Australia's livestock industries." 
This amendment to the research function, using exactly the same 
wording was also made by Dr Snowdon in an article in Animal Quarantine.^^ 
The change was finally made explicit in the CSIRO Ferguson Report when 
it was stated that, "The Committee sees no need to work on indigenous 
viruses as this work can be safely done in less secure laboratories."^^ 
As mentioned in the Introduction, Dr Lascelles, in 1976, expressed 
concern regarding the financing of endemic disease programmes at ANAHL. 
He saw this function as competing for resources with other laboratories 
within the CSIRO. This argument gained support especially within the 
i 
CSIRO and became known as the "Resources Issue". In a submission to the 
Ferguson Committee (1982) Dr Southcott, an Assistant Chief of the 
Division of Animal Health, said: 
"ANAHL will be a most costly facility to operate and 
will almost certainly distort spending on 
agricultural research in Australia. Should CSIRO be 
forced to continue in a managerial role, the 
biological and agricultural Divisions would be 
hardest hit but other parts of the Organisation would 
also be affected." 
It would appear that in recognition of this opposition, the CSIRO 
made a shift of emphasis in the research function of ANAHL. This 
assertion seems to be borne out by the ASTEC Report of December 1982. 
It recommended that "in general ANAHL should not undertake research on 
endemic animal diseases" lOland it justified this recommendation on the 
grounds of the resources issue. It stated "some opposition is based on 
a fear of reduced financial support. It should be possible to allay 
such fears on the grounds that the main role of ANAHL is to undertake 
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research and development on exotic diseases." 
In September 1982, at a time when the CSIRO was shifting away from 
endemic disease research, the BAH Report stated: "ANAHL will extend 
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endemic disease research." This would suggest that either the BAH was 
not subjected to the same pressure as the CSIRO or was not influenced by 
this pressure. 
Endemic disease research was originally promoted as an end in 
itself, providing advantages to the livestock industry as well as a 
justification for the establishment of ANAHL. Research was later 
extended to include exotic disease research and finally limited to 
exotic disease research. The decision that endemic disease research was 
not appropriate for a facility like ANAHL raised the question of wh«t 
does constitute appropriate research for ANAHL. 
The ASTEC Report listed as animal disease organisms of potential 








However the BAH Report listed exotic disease agents already in 
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Australia and included among the major animal disease agents were: 
DISEASE AGENT HELD AT YEAR OF IMPORTATION 
Bluetongue virus CSL 1976 
Rabies virus CSL 
Newcastle disease CSIRO 1932 
Fowl Plague viruses CSIRO 1976 
Aujeszky's Disease virus Institute of Medical 
and Veterinary 
Science, Adelaide 1979 ' 
Swine Fever virus CSIRO 1961 
Brucella species National Biological 
Standards Laboratory, 
Department of Health. 
Thus it would appear that research is currently being undertaken on 
exotic animal disease viruses without the facilities of ANAHL. This 
would seem to suggest that ANAHL is really only necessary for research 
work on FMD, yet in an address to the Rural Press Club in Brisbane on 
the 6th August, 1982, Dr Snowdon stated: "There are a number of inter-
nationally recognised laboratories carrying out research on FMD and it 
is not intended to carry out an intensive research programme on FMD at 
ANAHL" and he repeated this at the ANAHL Forum.^^^ 
Dr Lascelles (Chief, Division of Animal Health, CSIRO) who was 
invited to speak on the topic of research at the ANAHL Forum stated that 
FMD research is a 
"very generously researched area globally speaking 
and especially so in recent years. Enormous 
resources are being put into it. Some of the world's 
best scientists have been attracted to it and 
developments are occurring at an extremely rapid 
rate. ... I do not believe that Australia can 
afford to duplicate research when it is being done so 
well elsewhere ... I conclude that it would be totally 
inappropriate at this time for scarce national 
resources to be committed to research on FMD, a 
disease not present in this country and one in which 
the global effort is so large and progress so rapid. 
The BAH Report also stated: "ANAHL need not repeat, with diseases 
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such as FMD, research that has already been done extensively overseas." 
For once the proponents and opponents of ANAHL were in agreement, 
but the result would appear to be that ANAHL is left without a ' 
justifiable research function. 
Once again the PWC accepted the CSIRO arguments that research would 
provide an on-going function for ANAHL and that economic benefits to the 
livestock industry, and thus Australia's economy in general, as a result 
of advances in research, would follow. In order to further strengthen -
their arguments, the CSIRO claimed that an on-going research prograirane 
was essential to attract high calibre scientists who would be necessary 
should an outbreak occur, and to provide them with a continuing interest 
and maintain microbiological security measures. 
However in the face of later opposition based on economic 
arguments, the CSIRO altered its stance and recommended that ANAHL work 
only on exotic disease research. So the area of research interest was 
considerably narrowed from that proposed at the PWC. In view of the fact 
that other laboratories in Australia are already working with some 
important exotic viruses, as well as the general agreement that ANAHL 
should not work on FMD (not just on the grounds of safety but also on 
the grounds of duplication of research), it would appear that ANAHL is 
not necessary for undertaking research. However a research function 
would appear to be necessary for ANAHL in order to attract staff and 
keep their interest and to provide a continuous role for the facility. 
THE VACCINE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
FMD is a virus disease which, unlike diseases caused by bacteria, 
cannot be cured once it is established.^®^ The official policy for the 
control of an outbreak in Australia is prompt slaughter and sanitary 
disposal of infected animals; disinfection of affected property; 
prevention of movement of animals, animal products or other goods from 
adjacent areas; and careful monitoring of surrounding animals.^^^ 
i 
The slaughter eradication policy has been adopted by FMD-free 
countries because of the difficulties associated with vaccination, 
especially when the export market depends on freedom from the disease. 
An animal successfully immunised against a particular sub-type of virus 
can later become a symptomless carrier if infected by another, thus 
making it impossible to guarantee freedom from the disease in the 
vaccinated region. 
Advocates of vaccination in Australia stress that its use would not 
be an alternative to a "slaughter-out" programme, but would complement 
it in certain situations. They argue that "ring vaccination" (where 
animals around the perimeter of an outbreak are vaccinated) could be 
used if an outbreak was spreading faster than cotild be managed, or if it 
was discovered that FMD was established and widespread in livestock and 
feral animals in the large remote areas of Northern Australia. Once 
the spread had been checked, vaccinated animals would then need to be 
slaughtered in order to re-establish FMD-free status for trade purposes. 
Opponents claim that quarantine and slaughter would be adequate for 
any outbreak and that the disadvantages, costs and risks of vaccination 
outweigh any potential benefits. 
Present-day FMD vaccines use inactivated virus particles but 
research, using recombinant DNA techniques, is being carried out in an 
attempt to develop a safe alternative; safe, not only to manufacture 
since live virus is not required, but safe to use since there is no 
danger of the vaccine containing improperly inactivated virus. 
The Australian Academy of Science, in their May 1983 Report recog-
nised that "the question of the preparation and use of vaccines for FMD 
is one of the most controversial issues." ^^^ ' 
The reports on ANAHL made prior to the PWC Hearing, i.e., the 
Eichhorn Report, the CSVC report and the report of the AAC Panel, but 
not the IDC Report, recommended that vaccine production and testing be 
included as a function of ANAHL. 
The PWC Report concluded that "the only way in which Australia can 
guarantee the availability of vaccine, in the event of an outbreak of 
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FMD is to have its own maximum-security vaccine-producing facilities."^ 
There are two points to consider in this statement: first, 
whether or not the only way of obtaining guaranteed supplies is by 
producing the vaccine at ANAHL, and secondly whether or not Australia 
would ever use FMD vaccine in the event of an outbreak. 
In order to establish this first point, the arguments used at the 
PWC Hearing were that: 
1. The Animal Virus Research Institute, World Reference Laboratory, 
Pirbright, England, is the only acceptable manufacturer of FMD 
vaccine. 
2. Pirbright may be unreliable because: 
a) it may have to deal with outbreaks in Britain at the time; or 
b) it may be committed to vaccine production for another country. 
3. Pirbright may be unwilling to manufacture the vaccine if: 
a) it involves a new sub-type not previously encountered in 
Britain or Europe; or 
b) the laboratory changed its policy regarding the manufacture of 
vaccines for other countries. 
4. Obtaining vaccines from Pirbright would be costly. 
5. Stockpiling of vaccines is not a practical solution because: 
i 
a) the shelf-life is only short; 
b) a large range of vaccines would need to be stored to cover the 
various types and sub-types; and 
c) this would result in high costs. 
Dr Snowdon and Dr Pierce of the CSIRO presented these arguments in 
their submissions and during questioning at the PWC hearing to 
substantiate the need for a vaccine production unit at ANAHL. In his 
section of the CSIRO submission, Dr Snowdon pointed out that many 
countries will not permit the introduction of strains of virus that 
do not occur naturally in that country and therefore would not be able 
to produce vaccines of all the sub-types. Also some laboratories would be 
unacceptable because of their low standards of potency and safety 
testing. ̂ ^^ He concluded "At present, England is the only country that 
could manufacture vaccines against any strain of FMD virus in commercial 
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The CSIRO submission emphasised that Pirbright was the only 
possible manufacturer of vaccine, but always following this claim was the 
consideration of a factor which would limit Australia's reliance on 
Pirbright. 
Fol lowing the above quote, Dr Snowdon cont inued 
"The p o s s i b i l i t y o f con t rac t ing w i t h the company i n 
England t h a t makes FMD vaccine to supply vaccine i n 
t imes of emergency has been i nves t i ga ted , but because 
o f the costs invo lved and the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f 
guaranteeing supp l ies i n times o f emergejriqy, t h i s 
a l t e r n a t i v e was not developed f u r t h e r . " 
Dr Pierce of the CSIRO i n evidence s ta ted " i n the event o f having 
to vacc inate aga ins t FMD, A u s t r a l i a would be s o l e l y dependent on the 
product ion f a c i l i t i e s a t P i r b r i g h t . These f a c i l i t i e s could we l l be 
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committed a t the t ime to product ion o f vaccine f o r another coun t ry . " 
In another pa r t o f h is submission, Dr Pierce ra ised two more 
arguments. 
"At present the on ly place i n the wor ld where 
A u s t r a l i a could have an acceptable FMD vaccine 
prepared to combat an outbreak would be P i r b r i g h t , 
England. Too much re l i ance should not be placed on 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f these f a c i l i t i e s . P i r b r i g h t has 
no o v e r - r i d i n g commitment to A u s t r a l i a and would be 
i n no p o s i t i o n to consider an A u s t r a l i a n request f o r 
FMD vaccine i f i t were committed to coping w i t h an 
outbreak i n B r i t a i n . In add i t i on , there i s no 
guarantee t h a t P i r b r i g h t would be prepared, a t some 
f u t u r e date, to manufacture vaccine f o r A u s t r a l i a i f 
i t invo lved a s t r a i n o f FMD v i r u s n e t p rev ious l y 
encountered i n B r i t a i n or Europe."^^^ 
This l a t t e r p o i n t was expanded by Dr Pierce i n response to a 
quest ion dur ing cross-examinat ion. He s ta ted : 
" P i r b r i g h t r e a l l y has no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
manufactur ing vacc ine. We fee l t h a t i f they d id , 
they would do so because they are sympathetic to the 
A u s t r a l i a n problem. We have helped the Uni ted 
Kingdom on occasions when they have experienced 
problems w i t h ser ious outbreaks o f FMD. But i f they 
were i n d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h Europe, then I t h i nk they 
would put i t s problems f i r s t . And secondly, we have 
some anx ie ty t h a t w i t h the en t ry o f B r i t a i n i n the 
Common Market, the same so r t of r e s t r i c t i o n s which 
are placed on research i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Europe and 
A f r i c a , i n t h a t they w i l l not accept v i r u s s t r a i n s 
they do not experience i n t h e i r own c o u n t r i e s , might 
a lso be app l ied to the United Kingdom. We already 
have some evidence that the Department of Health I 
think, might be able to elaborate on, that some 
pressure is in fact already being put on the UK, not 
to import into Eurooe^ Asian strains which they have 
never experienced." 
This claim suggests that Pirbright may not even be prepared to test 
samples from outbreaks let alone manufacture vaccines for a different 
strain of FMD virus. 
Mr Kelly of the PWC Committee, apparently recognising this impli-
cation of Dr Pierce's statement, asked what we would do if the British 
would not do our testing. Dr Snowdon, not Dr Pierce, replied, "I would 
like to make this comment, that there is a big difference between doing 
n 9 
a confirmatory diagnosis and producing vaccine. Pirbright, he pointed 
out, does not know what sort of virus strains are in the samples until 
they are tested and so "would have to give up her responsibility as a 
reference laboratory for the whole world for diagnosis if we take that 
line of argument that she cannot take material from foreign countries 
producing vaccine, a tremendous difference, because in the production of 
vaccine that was not present in Europe you are producing huge quantities 
of virus during the vaccine production cycle with the danger that it may 
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escape." 
This information about the risk associated with vaccine production 
passed the PWC Committee without comment and there was no other 
reference made to the comparative risks associated with diagnosis and 
vaccine production in any of the submissions to the PWC. 
In anticipation of the argument that vaccine could be produced 
overseas and stored at ANAHL in readiness, rather than supplied in an 
emergency situation, another set of arguments were developed. Dr Snowdon 
argued against stockpiling on the grounds that the shelf-life of 
inactivated vaccine is only 6-12 months and therefore supplies would 
need to be constantly replaced. Also, because of the number of types 
and sub-types of FMD virus (seven main types and more than eighty sub-
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types) "large volumes of a whole range of vaccines" would need to be 
stored, and this, the CSIRO claimed, would be too expensive. 
These were put forward by Dr Snowdon as the main difficulties with 
i 
stockpiling. But the argument, that stockpiling would not cover 
the possibility of an outbreak being caused by a new strain was not used 
at this stage. 
In the CSIRO Submission Dr Pierce stated "The most successful 
vaccine is usually that prepared from the virus type or sub-type 
isolated from the outbreak, so that it would be necessary to stockpile 
large volumes of a whole range of vaccines and maintain them permanently 122 
refrigerated for use against a single disease." There is no 
suggestion in this statement that a new and unknown type would be 
involved. 
The CSIRO Ferguson Report stated: "In 1971-72 discussions were held 
with an overseas vaccine manufacturer about the possibility of it pro-
ducing and holding stocks of vaccine for use by Australia. At that 
time, the capital and recurrent costs were regarded as unacceptable, as 
were the risks of repudiation of an agreement in exceptional circum-
stances." ^^^ No estimation of the cost involved or a comparison with 
the cost of producing the vaccine at ANAHL were given, nor was there any 
suggestion that a new strain of virus would be involved. The arguments 
were based only on costs and unreliability. 
The Ferguson Report also noted that "an alternative to the pro-
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duction of FMD vaccines at ANAHL would be for Australia to share in a 
world bank of vaccines. Australia has participated in discussions on 
this proposal with the OIE and FAO over the past seven years. Little 
progress has been made, and the prospect of agreement seems remote. 
Meanwhile various countries such as the USA and Japan are developing 
1 
their own vaccine stockpiles." ^'•^This would suggest that the CSIRO 
arguments against stockpiling vaccines given at the PWC Hearing did not 
hold during these discussions from 1975-1982 and were not considered 
drawbacks by Japan and USA. Furthermore, the CSIRO in its booklet How 
would we cope with an Outbreak of FMD promoted the idea of stockpiling. 
It stated: "The Officer-in-Charge of ANAHL, after the laboratory was 
commissioned and approved as being microbiologically secure, had started 
manufacturing, testing arid stockpiling vaccines for the type of FMD 125 
virus that he judged most likely to enter Australia." 
The suggestion from the PWC evidence was that a supply of all the 
sub-types of vaccines would need to be stored, yet this CSIRO publication 
stated "probably about twelve different vaccines would be needed to 
control all forms of FMD. then went on to say 
"if vaccine was needed before they could develop one 
from the field strain itself, the one in store, 
although not ideal, would suffice. Meanwhile samples 
of the field strain had been dispatched to Pirbright, 
UK, the world reference centre for FMD viruses, for 
sub-typing. At ANAHL, scientists were building up 
stocks of the field-strain virus in laboratory tissue 
culture for the purpose of manufacturing a vaccine 
from it on a large scale. But they would need about 
three month^^efore they could supply this vaccine in 
quantity." 
This period of three months appears an optimistic one in view of 
the BAH Report which stated 
"The process of developing seeds and substrates for 
manufacture and scaling-up to production is time-
consuming. At the CSL, bluetongue vaccine seed 
preparation has taken several years and is not yet 
complete. It is too late to leave this until an 
exotic disease outbreak has started. Developmental 
work should be undertaken in advance of an outbreak. 
Such development could be under^ken at considerable 
expense overseas or at ANAHL."^^^ 
Yet until an outbreak occurs the strain of virus is unknown and 
therefore developmental work cannot be undertaken. 
i 
The PWC conclusions were based on CSIRO evidence that Pirbright was 
the only source but was unreliable in an emergency. However it was 
made apparent at the ANAHL Forum that neither Pirbright or Plum Island 
were self sufficient in vaccine production but purchased their 
stockpiles from commercial manufacturers. 
Dr Brown (Pirbright) stated: "You can always buy vaccines from 
commercial manufacturers. Any firm would sell their vaccine to you if 
you really needed it. Pirbright holds a stockpile on behalf of the 
Ministry, which is produced by Wellcome. Pirbright does not have its 
1 ?Q 
own facility for producing millions of doses. 
Dr Call is (Plum Island) stated: "Plum Island has a small vaccine 
production capability- something we estimate to be capable of producing 
three to five million doses of whole virus vaccine per year. The 
vaccine which is in storage and which belongs to my Government and that 
of Canada and Mexico was purchased both from Plum Island and on the 
international market. A Laboratory in Europe won the contract to 
produce seven million d o s e s . F r o m these statements it would appear 
that Pirbright itself would not be a source of supply, and that a 
variety of sources were available. 
Stockpiling, which could overcome the unreliability argument, was 
considered unsatisfactory and too costly by the PWC. But a change in 
strategy occurred when it became apparent that ANAHL would be engaged in 
stockpiling vaccines, thus eliminating another part of the CSIRO 
argument. 
The emphasis was then placed on the likelihood of the outbreak 
being caused by a new, unknown strain of virus. The Ferguson Report argued 
that "an overseas stockpile of vaccines 
against the major FMD sub-types does not cover the eventuality th§t they 
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may not protect stock against the outbreak strain", but then neither 
does manufacturing and stockpiling vaccines at ANAHL prior to an 
outbreak. And it is not explained why Australia should experience a new 
strain of virus when the dangers of an outbreak are supposedly 
associated with the accidental introduction of the virus from overseas 
by livestock or livestock products. 
The CSIRO, in evidence to the PWC, claimed that many countries would 
not be prepared to manufacture vaccines using a strain not experienced 
by them and that even Pirbright may be unwilling to do this in the 
future, but on the other hand it was encouraging Australia to produce and 
stockpile a range of vaccines despite being free from FMD altogether. 
The ASTEC Report concluded that "it has not been demonstrated that 
adequate supplies (of FMD vaccine) could not be obtained, or made under 
contract, overseas and to standards of potency and safety acceptable 
to Australian authorities" and that "having vaccine manufactured 
overseas may appear expensive, but, in fact, the vaccine is generally 132 
only a small proportion of the total cost of an immunisation campaign." 
At the ANAHL Forum (August 1982) Professor B. Morris stated that: 
"adequately tested FMD vaccines are available in 
large quantities commercially and these commercially 
produced vaccines are the ones bought and stockpiled 
by the Pirbright and Plum Island (USA) laboratories. 
If these labs are prepared to buy in vaccines there 
can be no case for Australia to begin making them. 
Further, we heard from Dr Brown (Deputy Director -
Pirbright) and Dr Callis (Director, Plum Island) that 
new generations of synthetic FMD vaccines, produced 
from non-infective material by recombinant DNA and 
organic synthetic techniques will be available in the 
next few years. It is sad, but entirely predictable, 
that the planning of ANAHL in relation to FMD vaccinq33 
production has been bypassed by the new immunology." 
The second point to consider in relation to the vaccine production 
function is whether or not Australia would ever use FMD vaccine. There 
has been much debate recently on this point because of its relevance to 
the importation of live FHD virus. 
A vaccine production facility has always been included in the 
design of ANAHL, apparently at a considerable cost. The Department of 
Works pointed out to the PWC that the microbiologically secure areas are 
a complex which must be built at the one time; "it is no good saying 
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you will leave the vaccine laboratory till a later stage". Dr Pierce 
stated during questioning at the PWC Hearing that "one of the rather 
expensive parts of the facility is related to the need for safety, 135 
particularly in vaccine production." But as the CSIRO had made 
1 "̂fi 
clear, the CSL can manufacture vaccines from viruses less virulent 
that FMD. The CSL has previously manufactured smallpox vaccine, is 
currently working with bluetongue virus vaccine, and has had "over sixty 
years experience in producing and testing medical and veterinary 
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vaccines." 
Thus the only reason for a vaccine production unit at ANAHL is to 
produce FMD vaccine. In order to justify this facility it is necessary 
to, not only promote ANAHL as the only reliable source of vaccine, but 
to promote the use of vaccination as part of the control programme. 
There seems to be some confusion about the importance of the 
vaccine production function. The CSIRO Report, Live Exotic Disease 
Agents at ANAHL, April 1982, stated: "one of the main reasons for 
constructing ANAHL was to give Australia a facility capable of allowing 
FMD virus to be studied with safety and with the capacity to produce 
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FMD vaccine." Yet in a CSIRO News Release, Or Wild (Chairman) said 
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"vaccine production will be a minor function of ANAHL". At the ANAHL 
Forum held in August 1982, Dr Boardman (CSIRO Executive Member) stated 
"there has been no decision by the CSIRO Executive to go ahead with the 140 vaccine production facility." The CSIRO Ferguson Committee Report of 
November 1982 maintained that "ANAHL would be the only absolutely 
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reliable source of vaccine against the outbreak strain." 
Apparently the use of FMD vaccine was considered a possibility from 
the time ANAHL was first discussed in 1964, since vaccine production and 
testing were included in the original functions for the laboratory and 
in subsequent reports. Yet a reading of more recent reports suggests 
that it is only with the advent of improve^nts in vaccines and control 
methods that vaccination has become a possible method of control for 
Australia. 
At the PWC Hearing Senator Melzer asked Mr Gee (Department of 
Health): "Would you agree with the CSIRO opinion that if there was an 
outbreak of, say, FMD in Australia at the Boment our only recourse would 
be to kill the animals concerned and not worry about using vaccines?" 
Mr Gee: Sure. All our control plans, all our eradication plans are 
based on a slaughter policy. We would only use vaccination if 
we were really pushed to the wall; if it was out of control or 
in too large an area; if we thought we needed a ring buffer 
of vaccinated animals to help us control it. I think it is 
unlikely that we would ever have to use vaccination but I 
would not way that it would never be possible -
Senator Melzer: It would be a last resort? 
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Mr Gee: It would be a last resort, yes." 
In answer to a question Dr Pierce gives a lengthy answer on Irhe 
disadvantages of vaccination. 
"First of all you have to remember that a 
country has an advantage in being free of disease. 
This is an advantage in that, particularly as an 
exporting country--more so in Australia than in the 
United Kingdom--we export from a country which is 
free of foot and mouth disease. This is a great 
economic advantage on world markets. Japan and the 
United States welcome our meat probably—as much as 
for any other reason--because it comes from a country 
that is free from foot and mouth disease. Once you 
begin to vaccinate your animals, you have a popu-
lation which is general is immune. This means that 
if foot and mouth comes into the country, it will not 
necessarily declare itself immediately because a 
proportion of your population resists it. The great 
advantage of having the population fully susceptible 
is that when you get an introduction--and these are 
the considerations that the United Kingdom has taken 
into account--the disease immediately declares 
itself. You can immediately get on to it and hope-
fully you can immediately eradicate it and so main-
tain this ideal status of being disease-free. The 
other consideration is that unfortunately the best of 
foot and mouth vaccines is a poor one. In other 
words, it is not as if you can vaccinate an animal 
and then say that for the rest of its natural life it 
is going to be immune. Really to immunise animals 
effectively for all time, I would say—and my 
colleague might wish to comment further on this--the 
animals would ideally be vaccinated at least twice a 
year. Remember that we are dealing with a disease to 
which not only cattle are susceptible; pigs are 
susceptible to it, goats are susceptible to it, sheep 
are susceptible to it and cattle are susceptible to 
it. If we assume that to maintain an immune popu-
lation you have to vaccinate all those species twice 
a year, in perpetuity, once you start, then we begin 
to see why, from an economic point of view, it is 
actually an advantage to withstand the enormous 
losses which you may get in eradicating it than 
trying to accept that the alternative is a preferable 
one, of continuously vaccinating. Also remember, as 
has already been mentioned, that the vaccine is not a 
very effective one for pigs. Also remember that we 
have a susceptible feral population of pigs, and 
these are very difficult to get at to vaccinate. So, 
once you determine to vaccinate you really are in 
serious trouble if ever you want to regain the status 
of disease-free. You are then committed to 
vaccination and it would be extremely difficult to * 
get back to a situation of being disease-free which 
is so advantageous to us. One might point out that 
the United States would probably like to deal, for 
its beef, with South American countries. They are 
nearer; they are politically more interesting. But 
they do have foot and mouth disease, and this gives 
Australia the immense advantage with countries 
. importing meat. Remembe»" that we are the biggest 
exporters of meat in the world today." 
Yet in the CSIRO submission Dr Snowdon said "Depending on where the 
outbreak occurs, it may be necessary to vaccinate susceptible livestock 
surrounding the outbreak to prevent the disease spreading to other 
areas. Thus the principal aim of the vaccination production unit in 
ANAHL will be to produce vaccine that will be used to contain an 
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outbreak of FMD during the period it is being eradicated." 
It would appear that the submission contained a much stronger 
statement that vaccination would be used than was evident during cross-
examination. 
The April 1982 CSIRO Report attempted to provide a rationale for 
the use of vaccines in an eradication campaign. It stated "the quality 
and safety of vaccines available in 1970 was such that widespread 
vaccination as a control measure in these circumstances would not have 
been considered. However this policy was reviewed in 1979 after consul-
tation with overseas authorities on the control of FMD ... The respons-
ibie Australian authorities now believe that vaccination might well be 
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used in an eradication campaign under some circumstances." 
But the circumstances noted are the same ones given at the 1974 PWC 
hearing, namely if an explosive outbreak occurred in say the Gippsland 
region or if an outbreak occurred in the remote areas of Northern 
Australia. The idea of using vaccination in Australia's remote areas 
was first officially suggested by K. Mcintosh (Department of Health) at 
the Australian Veterinary Association NSW Annual Conference in 1965, so 
it is hardly a new idea or because of improvements in methods of 
control. 
The CSIRO Ferguson Report also refers to the change in current 
thinking regarding vaccination. It stated: 
"It is now accepted [by organisations such as 
International Office of Epozootics (OIE), Pan 
American FMD Centre and Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)] that early 
vaccination could be an important component in 
eradication, even in the case of the introduction of 
infection J^to a country previously free from the 
disease." ̂ ^^ 
The Report continued: "The Committee suggests that it should now be 
accepted that vaccination in conjunction with slaughter may be part of the 
campaign for the eradication of an outbreak of FMD."^^^ 
At the ANAHL Forum, Dr Callis (Director of Plum Island) quoted FAO 
figures indicating that 40% of the outbreaks of FMD in Europe "were due to 
virus in vaccines, i.e., improper inactivation".^^^ Dr Brown (Deputy 
Director, Pirbright) disputed these figures claiming he had seen figures 
which ranged from 75% to 100% but he maintained "there is no evidence at 
all for any of these figures. There is only one proven case and that was 
the one in 1981 (on the Isle of Wight)." Dr Brown continued: "If we had 
believed the gossip and the FAO and OIE statements we may have been saying 
the German outbreak was caused by the German laboratory nearby or the 
Danish outbreak. It was not caused by either of those. It was caused by a 
virus, the source of which we do not know." ̂ ^^ 
It is an interesting anomaly that the FAO and OIE, according to Dr 
Brown, overestimated the role of faulty vaccines in their reports, yet 
according to the CSIRO these same bodies are now advocating the wider 
use of vaccination as an adjunct to slaughter even in previously FMD-
free countries. However the December 1981 edition of Rural Research, a 
CSIRO quarterly would suggest that the CSIRO held different views at 
that time. In a seven page section on ANAHL there was no mention of 
vaccine production at ANAHL apart from the one sentence: "In the futiire 
Australia may produce its own FMD vaccines by genetic engineering, or 
import them." ^^^ This same article stated that with existing vaccines 
there "is always a risk of them being contaminated with active live 
virus" and that "if vaccination is resorted to in an eradication 
campaign, it may delay an official declaration that Australia is free of 
the disease for months or years." ^^^ 
Even if we ignore the arguments against using vaccination as part of 
a control programme it seems unlikely that ANAHL could produce enough 
vaccine for the specified situations i.e., an explosive outbreak in cattle 
intensive areas or a widespread outbreak in remote areas. 
The unit at ANAHL was designed to produce 200,000 doses per month. 
When questioned by the PWC about how this figure was reached Dr Snowdon 
replied: 
"This figure was arrived at after consultation with 
the various State disease control authorities. In 
Other words, it was a figure which was arrived at on 
information that they provided to us at that time and 
we specifically went after this figure so that we 
would know exactly what was required." 
Senator Poyser: Have you made any projections on 
what could be the maximum quantity of vaccine needed 
at any given time? 
Dr Snowdon: This is very difficult of course. You 
have to think of hypothetical situations which may 
arise - you may have a situation where the disease 
may become widespread. You may have to increase the ^ 
size of the vaccine production unit to c&oe with it. 
So it is a fairly difficult situation." 
It seems doubtful that this production capacity (even if it were able 
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to be doubled as is suggested by Dr Snowdon) could provide sufficient 
vaccine to cope with an explosive outbreak considering that in 1981-82 
Australia's livestock included 25 million cattle, 136 million sheep and 
2.4 million pigs. If the outbreak was caused by a new strain of virus, 
reserve stock could not be used and a new vaccine would need to be 
developed. 
According to Mr Gee "the USA is laying down a strategic reserve of 153 
twelve million doses of FMD vaccine". Even at the rate of 400,000 doses 
per month, ANAHL would require 2-1/2 years full-time operation to produce 
that number of vaccines, and by the end of that 2-1/2 years more than half 
the vaccines would have passed their expiry date. 
The ASTEC Committee were not convinced by the arguments promoting 
the advantages of vaccination in a control programme, seeing them as 
"open to doubt".^^^ They stated: "Under most circumstances, any animals 
vaccinated in Australia would have to be slaughtered later, and it may 155 
be asked, why go to the trouble and expense of vaccination at all?" 
They disputed the need for "ring vaccination" and its effectiveness and 
maintained that slaughter was quicker and more effective than vaccination. 
The Report concluded "only in the most exceptional circumstances would 
FMD vaccine be used in Australia" and "even if the use of vaccines was 
considered likely it would be necessary to show that no suitable supplies 
could be obtained or produced under contract overseas before agreement was 
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given for this high-risk operation to proceed at ANAHL." 
A commitment to vaccine production was made from the time of the 
earliest reports on ANAHL, and this commitment determined to a large 
extent the design of ANAHL. The arguments concerned with justifying the 
inclusion of a vaccine production facility centre around two main points, 
namely, whether Australia would ever use FMD vaccine and whether it could 
reliably obtain vaccine from other sources. 
The CSIRO used a variety of arguments at the PWC Hearing to demon-
strate that overseas manufacturers would be unreliable, unsatisfactory or 
too costly, both in an emergency situation and for the purposes of 
stockpiling. Overseas laboratories, they claimed, may not satisfy safety 
standards, they may not permit the production of vaccine if it contains a 
type of virus not previously encountered by them, they may be committed to 
producing vaccine for other users at the time or they may choose not to 
produce it for a variety of reasons such as war, politics or changes in 
policy. Stockpiling, which could potentially overcome some of these 
limitations, was criticised on the grounds of the short shelf-life of the 
vaccine, the large range that would need to be stored, and the cost these 
would involve. The possibility that the outbreak strain could be a new 
variety of the virus received little attention at this time. 
Evidence which seemed to contradict these arguments appeared to 
pass the PWC Committee unquestioned, as did the problem of risk despite Dr 
Snowdon having pointed out that vaccine production involved a much higher 
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risk than diagnosis. 
At the ANAHL Forum it was made clear that Pirbright was not the 
only source of vaccine, and in fact, it was not a source of large 
quantities at all since, it relied on commercial manufacturers as did the 
USA. The arguments demonstrating the disadvantages of stockpiling would 
appear questionable given that Britain, Japan and USA were all stockpiling 
large amounts of vaccine and that stockpiling was planned for ANAHL once 
the production unit was functioning. 
It would seem that once it became apparent that the arguments against 
stockpiling and against obtaining vaccine from overseas suppliers were 
inadequate, the CSIRO changed its emphasis and began to concentrate on 
the argument that an outbreak could involve a previously unknown strain of 
virus. If this were the case, they argued, stockpiling would be 
ineffective and some overseas laboratories may not be prepared to 
manufacture the vaccine, but the CSIRO gave no evidence as to why an 
outbreak would involve a new strain, nor did they demonstrate how the 
vaccine production unit at ANAHL could produce enough vaccine in time to 
be useful as a control measure. 
The more basic question of whether Australia would, or should, use 
FMD vaccine raised even greater difficulties for the advocates of vaccine 
production at ANAHL. In its submission to the PWC, the CSIRO gave no 
indication of the problems associated with vaccination. However during 
questioning unequivocal statements were made about the risk and cost 
involved if Australia used vaccination as a control measure. This drew no 
unfavourable comment from the PWC Committee and had no effect on the 
approval of vaccine production as an appropriate function for ANAHL. 
When this function was questioned, as a result of the controversy 
over the importation and manipulation of live FMD virus prior to an 
outbreak, the CSIRO argued that improved vaccines and new techniques in 
disease control now favoured the use of vaccination as an adjunct to 
slaughter. However the ASTEC Committee was not convinced, reaffirming the 
view that vaccination would only be used in "the most exceptional 
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circumstances." 
It was maintained by Dr Jones (Executive Officer, Australian'Meat 
Research Committee) at the ANAHL Forum that the CSIRO was "stubbornly and 
rather woodenly now insisting on the need to import [FMD] virus for the 
purposes of making and stockpiling vaccine. It seems to me that it has now 160 
become an obsession with CSIRO." 
However it could be argued that because the vaccine production unit 
was an integral part of the design of ANAHL and was constructed, at great 
cost especially to produce FMD vaccine, and since it could not 
justifiably be used for any other purpose, that the CSIRO had to reaffirm 
its commitment and find new arguments to justify this function in the face 
of increasing opposition. 
THE ROLE OF THE CSIRO 
It would seem appropriate at this point to examine the role of the 
CSIRO in relation to ANAHL. 
The official statement of the function of the CSIRO is contained in 
the CSIRO submission to the PWC: "In October 1972 the Ministers for 
Education and Science, Health, and Primary Industry made a joint sub-
mission to Cabinet recommending the acceptance, in principle, of the 
i 
establishment of a maximum security animal health laboratory to be 
administered and operated by the CSIRO. 
However, it would appear that the CSIRO was involved in some of the 
investigations of the need for and functions of ANAHL prior to 1972, and 
therefore played a role in decision making. The Chief of the CSIRO was 
a member of the Inter-Departmental Committee formed by the Minister of 
Health to examine the proposal for an animal health laboratory. The 
Chairman of CSIRO was invited by the Chairman of the AAC Panel 
(Secretary, Department of Primary Industry) to form a team to invest-
igate the feasibility of establishing ANAHL. The Chairman of CSIRO then 
appointed the Chief of the Division of Animal Health CSIRO to form an 
Advisory Proposal Committee comprising representatives of the CSIRO, the 
Department of Health and the Department of Housing and Construction. 
This Committee then formed a Proposal Evaluation Team (PET) comprising 
the Officer-in-Charge designate of ANAHL, senior CSIRO architect. Assis-
tant Director of National Biological Standards Laboratory and an 
architect and engineer from the Department of Housing and Construction. 
Throughout the PWC Inquiry the CSIRO stressed their role as an 
operating authority only, with no power to formulate policy. During 
questioning at the PWC Hearing Dr Snowdon stated: 
"I think I should make it clear that the 
responsibility within the Australian Government for 
areas related to animal matters rests either with the 
Department of Agriculture or the Department of 
Health, depending on the situation. CSIRO has no 
executive responsibilities in these areas, no formal 
executive responsibilities; it is a research 
organisation. We are here, and we have accepted the 
responsibility of operating this laboratory - if it 
is established - because the other agencies have felt 
we are the most appropriate body to operate it."^^^ 
Dr Allen pointed out that the CSIRO were not responsible for 
determining the functions of the laboratory. He stated: "... the 
functions of the laboratory, as laid down by bodies of that kind [i.e, 
AAC and CSVC] were subject to constraint and we have for the moment 
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accepted that constraint as being a reasonable one." 
Dr Allen later stressed the point that the CSIRO was only an 
operating authority and not a policy maker. He stated: 
"I think the simplest way of looking at it is to 
start with the origins of the proposal. One of the 
origins was the AAC and its Standing Committee, and 
there was also the CSVC. The AAC, as you know 
comprises the Federal Minister for Agriculture and 
the State Ministers and the Standing Committee 
comprises the senior officers from those bodies. 
I suppose looked at in terms of what the impact is 
and what industry is involved, one could argue that 
the primary executive responsibility really rests 
with the Department of Agriculture. It is after all 
a primary industry matter, with the Department of 
Health having statutory responsibility in certain 
quarantine and related areas. The position of CSIRO 
is governed by an Act called the Science and Industry 
Research Act which defines the organisation and gives 
it its functions, which are the undertaking of 
research and investigations in connection with, or 
for the promotion of, primary and secondary industry. 
So we really come into the situation simply as the 
operating authority without the policy or executive 
responsibility. I think, given that background, you 
will understand why yesterday there were a number of 
questions which were of a policy nature about which I 
could simply state what the policy was, as we 
understood it. but we do not have any role in 
formulating that policy. So our role is essentially 
that of the operating authority." ̂ ^^ 
Dr Allen also claimed that the initiative to establish ANAHL did not come 
from the CSIRO: 
"... the initiative in this matter did not come from 
CSIRO; it came as I said, from the AAC and the CSVC. 
Some of the early history, set out in Dr Pierce's 
evidence, I think, clearly demonstrates that. We 
have come in - in a sense - as the body thought by 
both the Department of Agriculture and the Department . 
of Health as most appropriate to operate a facility 
of this kind if it were established. But the 
initiative did not come from us; it came from the 
Departments of Health and Agriculture through the 
various Commonwealth and State bodies in the fields 
in which these two departments operate. 
Mr Gee also defined the CSIRO's role as administrators and not 
policy makers: 
"... we are satisfied that CSIRO is the best body to 
administer this laboratory. Our department (Health) 
will have a role in the determination of policies of 
the laboratory on important issues such as, for 
example, whether or not it ought to handle foot and 
mouth virus. The permanent head of the Department of 
Health is a member of the Consultative Committee 
which will determine the broad policies and operation 
of the laboratory." ̂ ^^ 
At the ANAHL Forum (August 1982) Dr Boardman (CSIRO Executive 
Member) stated: "The CSIRO Executive has made no decision as yet as to 
whether there will be a vaccine production facility at ANAHL. That 
decision will be made in the light of an assessment of current 
technology." ̂ ^^ When another delegate pointed out to him that a 1982 CSIRO 
Booklet stated that ANAHL would produce vaccines Dr Boardman stated: 
"There has been no decision by the CSIRO Executive to go ahead with the 
vaccine production facility. That issue is to be looked at over the 
next few months. No decision has been made. That is the correct 
position and I, as a member of the CSIRO Executive, should know what it 
These comments would suggest that the CSIRO were involved in 
decision making and policy making and not just operators of ANAHL. Dr 
Boardman made no reference to the PWC approval of vaccine production nor 
any mention of initiatives from other authorities or consultation with 
these policy makers. 
The decision was made by November that year. The Ferguson fteport 
stated: "A vaccine production system for producing killed whole-virus 
vaccines is to be installed at ANAHL. 
The function of endemic disease research was also one approved by 
the PWC, however as a result of controversy, this function was deleted. 
The Ferguson Report made it clear that this was a CSIRO decision 
apparently without prior approval from the policy making bodies: 
"The Committee sees no need to work on indigenous viruses." 
Thus it could be concluded that the role of the CSIRO extends 
beyond administering and staffing ANAHL. It would appear that the CSIRO 
was involved in some of the early investigations initiating the 
establishment of ANAHL and that they have considerable influence in 
policy making. 
The ambiguous role of the CSIRO is still evident in the most recent 
controversy over ANAHL. Dr Wild (Chairman, CSIRO) stated in a recent 
News Release that "in relation to ANAHL CSIRO acts purely as the agent 
of government and it is up to the government and not the CSIRO to decide 
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on future policy." However Mr Barry Jones claimed that "The CSIRO is in 
a position of great embarrassment about the future of ANAHL." ̂ ^^ It would 
seem significant that Mr Jones mentioned the CSIRO and not the 
Department of Primary Industry, the Department of Health, the Bureau of 
Animal Health or the AAC, i.e., the initiators and policy makers of 
ANAHL. 
On the one hand the CSIRO maintain they are not involved in policy 
making, yet on the other hand they would appear to take initiatives in 
policy making. They apparently had the authority to alter a PWC-approved 
function with regard to endemic disease research and to make a fjnal 
decision with regard to vaccine production. 
Thus there would appear to be a discrepancy between the role the 
CSIRO claim they play and the role they actually play with regard 
to decision making. 
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DISCUSSION 
The Arguments 
The original purpose of ANAHL was to perform diagnosis and to 
produce vaccines in the event of an outbreak of exotic disease. However 
it would seem that once the idea for a maximum security animal health 
laboratory was put forward, a number of other functions were promoted as 
appropriate undertakings for this laboratory. Thus it would appear that 
although the original suggestion to establish ANAHL answered a partic-
ular need, later functions were included as additional ways of using the 
facility. 
This led to two different styles of argument. The first claimed 
that a maximum security animal health laboratory was needed to undertake 
diagnosis and vaccine production in a disease outbreak situation, that 
is, a need had been recognised and ANAHL provided a means of achieving 
the desired ends. The second group of arguments claimed that if a 
maximum security animal health 1aboratory were established, research, 
training and quarantine testing could also be undertaken there. In this 
case, a means, namely ANAHL, was already identified and the arguments 
concentrated on showing that there was a need to perform these other 
functions to achieve other desirable ends. 
So the arguments for diagnosis were not concerned with why it was 
necessary to do diagnosis as such, but with why ANAHL was needed to do 
it, whereas arguments for training, research and quarantine testing 
concentrated on justifying the activity rather than arguing that ANAHL 
was necessary. As a result, a criticism common to the arguments 
justifying these activities is that they do not demonstrate that a 
maximum security animal health laboratory is necessary to train, to 
undertake research or even to undertake follow-up testing after an 
outbreak has occurred. 
It would seem that these subsidiary functions, although not 
providing the major reason for the establishment of ANAHL, did provide 
additional justification by showing that ANAHL could be usefully 
employed outside a disease outbreak situation, and that economic 
i 
advantages would result which would help underwrite the cost of 
establishing and running the facility. 
It was argued that a training programme at ANAHL would enable more 
veterinary officers to participate in training courses where animals 
were infected with the virus, and that this would result in earlier and 
more accurate diagnosis of diseases. This argument was further extended 
to claim that a training programme would result in the acceleration of 
an eradication campaign and thus reduce economic losses. So training, it 
was argued, provided an on-going function for ANAHL as well as enhancing 
Australia's ability to cope with an exotic disease outbreak. 
Research also provided a continuous activity for ANAHL and it was 
argued that research was essential if competent scientists were to be 
attracted and if their interest and expertise were to be retained 
between outbreak situations. In this way research was related to the 
major function of diagnosis, but economic arguments justifying research 
were also used. It was claimed that scientific breakthroughs resulting 
from research into animal diseases may result in economic advantages to 
primary industry in general, and improvements in diagnostic techniques 
and disease control methods may facilitate an eradication campaign and 
thus reduce the economic losses associated with an outbreak. 
Diagnosis was also extended to include quarantine testing, thus 
providing another on-going function for ANAHL with economic incentives. 
It was argued that the establishment of ANAHL would complement the Cocos 
Island Quarantine Station and these two facilities would mean that a 
wider variety of livestock could be imported into Australia, thus 
providing economic advantages to the livestock industry and hence 
Australia's economy in general. ' 
Changes in Functions 
The increase in the number of functions proposed for ANAHL occurred 
during the period of intensive investigation by the CSVC, the IDC, the 
AAC Panel and the PET into the need, functions and feasibility of 
establishing a maximum security animal health laboratory. The inclusion 
of the functions of research, training and quarantine testing meant 
it was not necessary to rely solely on the arguments of risk of an 
outbreak occurring to justify the establishment of ANAHL. These 
functions provided arguments to demonstrate that ANAHL could undertake 
useful and economically viable functions between outbreaks, or even if 
there were no outbreaks. 
All these arguments were presented to and accepted by the PWC. The 
economic viability of ANAHL was accepted on the basis of endemic disease 
research alone following the conclusions of the BAE study. 
The controversy over the importation of live FMD virus and the 
allocation of resources in the early 1980s resulted in the 
appropriateness of the functions of ANAHL being re-examined. A direct 
consequence of the resources issue was the elimination of endemic 
disease research as a function of ANAHL despite its approval by the PWC. 
The debate over the advisability of importing live FMD virus raised 
the question of the advisability of producing and using FMD vaccine. 
This led to the claim that vaccine production was only a minor function 
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of ANAHL despite its having been included as a function from the 
inception of ANAHL and its having influenced the design of ANAHL. 
But while vaccine production was reduced to a minor role, quarantine 
testing was now emphasized along with its economic advantages. The BAH 
Report of 1982 highlighted this shift. The functions of ANAHL listed in 
it were to: 
1. increase Australia's preparedness to diagnose, control and 
eradicate outbreaks of exotic diseases; 
2. facilitate the safe importation of livestock; and 
3. facilitate the export of livestock and livestock products.^^^ 
So quarantine testing had become a major function and the other PWC-
approved functions were combined into the broad function of diagnosis, 
control and eradication. 
Collingridge points out that if objectives are stated imprecisely 
it is difficult, and often impossible, to criticise those objectives or 174 
to show that they could have been achieved by other means. In the 
case of ANAHL the contentious areas of vaccination and vaccine 
production, training, and research, were subsumed into the general 
categories of diagnosis, control and eradication. 
Stating the objectives or functions of ANAHL in these general terms 
allows a broad interpretation of the means of achieving these 
objectives. Furthermore this interpretation is made by those closely 
involved with the operation of ANAHL and is not therefore subject to 
public scrutiny in advance of the implementation of the activity. 
Collingridge also claims that objectives can be changed to protect 
a decision made earlier, or an objective can be invented if the original 
objective is no longer satisfactory. ^^^Although quarantine testing was 
included as part of the diagnostic function at the PWC Inquiry, it could 
be argued that its new prominence constituted a change in objectives. 
i 
The use of vaccination to control an FMD outbreak had been strongly 
criticised and the need to produce FMD vaccine at ANAHL had therefore 
been questioned. The necesssity and safety of infecting animals in 
order to train veterinarians had also been criticised, thus bringing 
into question the appropriateness of the training function. Although 
the elimination of endemic disease research quelled some opposition, the 
question of what constituted appropriate research for ANAHL remained 
unanswered. 
Quarantine testing provided ANAHL with an on-going function and 
one that could be put forward as offering economic advantages. In view 
of the prior approval and establishment of the Cocos Island Quarantine 
Station, the promotion of quarantine testing seemed an ideal solution. 
However this function was also criticised on the grounds of the danger 
involved in importing livestock from high-risk areas and also on 
economic grounds. It was argued that the high cost of importing whole 
animals was unnecessary in view of the advances in breeding using ova 
and semen. 
The most recent criticisms of the functions of ANAHL have called 
into question the appropriateness of ANAHL to perform diagnosis, the 
major function and reason for the establishment of the facility. It has 
been suggested that a flexible, decentralised approach using mobile on-
site units would be preferable to the rigid, centralised approach 
offered by ANAHL. 
The changing arguments concerning functions appear to be primarily 
in response to the changing climate of opinion about ANAHL. When the 
investigations and discussions were limited to the interested parties 
and institutions, the range of functions flourished, apparently in.an 
attempt to demonstrate the necessity and viability of establishing such 
a facility. However once these functions were challenged in the public 
arena, changes and shifts of emphasis were made, apparently to protect 
the original decision that there was a need for ANAHL. 
Two different responses to these challenges were seen in the 
vaccine production function and the research function. The controversy 
over performing research on endemic disease came mainly from within the 
CSIRO. But it could be argued that a more important factor in the 
decision to eliminate endemic disease research was that the same 
research facilities could be used for a variety of research activities. 
Thus the specifics could be easily altered without losing a function. 
However, in the case of vaccine production there was no other 
justifiable use for the vaccine production unit incorporated into the 
design of ANAHL; it had already been admitted that CSL could undertake 
production of vaccines less virulent than FMD. Therefore in order to 
retain FMD vaccine production as a function, and hence a justification 
for the inclusion of a vaccine production unit and for ANAHL itself, 
the arguments promoting the need to produce FMD vaccine and the 
increased liklihood of using FMD vaccine in Australia were intensified. 
Vaccine production was retained as an appropriate function for 
ANAHL, although reduced to a minor role, despite public opposition. 
Endemic disease research was eliminated despite public approval and 
demonstrations of its economic advantages and relevance to the livestock 
industry. These decisions would appear to have been based on political 
considerations rather than scientific arguments. 
Unwarranted Extensions to Arguments 
* 
Although training and research were promoted primarily as on-going 
functions of ANAHL they were also related to an outbreak situation. It 
was claimed that if training were undertaken by ANAHL, earlier and more 
accurate diagnoses would result and this would reduce the time taken to 
control an outbreak and hence reduce economic losses. Similarly it was 
argued that research could result in improved methods of control 
which could also mean reduced losses. 
The claim that training and research could influence the course of 
an outbreak and its subsequent eradication would seem to be an 
unwarranted extension of the arguments and evidence presented, and would 
appear to ignore the many factors involved. There is no guarantee that 
research could find new methods of control or that these discoveries 
could influence the duration of trade bans. Likewise there was no 
evidence to suggest that training, by infecting animals at ANAHL, would 
result in earlier detection. The primary producer, the vital first line 
of defence, was not included in the proposed training courses at ANAHL. 
At best, early detection could reduce the duration of trade bans 
by days, an insignificant effect in view of the losses involved in an 
outbreak and the subsequent six to twelve month ban by the main trading 
partners. 
Although explicitly stating that these various functions would 
reduce the economic impact of an outbreak, the evidence about the 
liklihood and means of achieving this was extremely vague. In his 
submission to the PWC, Dr Pierce stated "A reduction in lost trading 
time of even a few months could represent a gain of millions of dollars 
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from agricultural exports'. However there was no supporting evidence 
at the PWC or in subsequent reports that earlier, more accurate Tield or 
laboratory diagnosis, new methods of control or vaccination could result 
in a reduction of this order. 
Both diagnosis and vaccine production were directly concerned with 
an outbreak of exotic disease. The arguments promoting these two 
functions, as well as highlighting the inadequacies of the present • 
arrangements or other alternatives, also attempted to demonstrate that 
economic advantages to Australia would result from ANAHL undertaking 
these functions. It was argued that if diagnosis and vaccine production 
were performed at ANAHL this would speed up an eradication campaign and 
thus result in a considerable reduction in economic losses. However 
there would appear to be no supporting evidence to substantiate this 
extension of argument. 
The delay in sending samples for testing to Pirbright could be 
measured by the time taken to transport these samples from the outbreak 
site to Britain. According to the evidence, vaccination would only be 
used as a last resort when the disease was unable to be controlled by a 
slaughter-out programme. So again the delay would be the time taken to 
have supplies of vaccine sent from commercial manufacturers overseas. 
If a new strain vaccine was required, no significant difference in the 
time to produce it here or overseas would occur. The potential for 
delay in the recognition of the symptoms would appear to be in the 
period prior to calling in the authorities. However even in the Danish 
outbreak the delay was less than a week - a far cry from the "few 
months" suggested by Dr Pierce's statement. 
Although presented as scientific arguments, there appears to be no 
evidence for the claims that if ANAHL performs these functions,¿concrete 
economic advantages of the order suggested by Dr Pierce would occur. 
The use of these arguments would therefore appear to be a political act 
which added weight to the justifications of the need for ANAHL to 
perform these functions. 
A1ternatives 
Dr Snowdon, in his evidence to the PWC suggested that the only 
alternative to establishing ANAHL was to establish similar facilities 
in each of the States.^^^his was not, however, meant to suggest that 
such an alternative should be considered, but rather to demonstrate that 
there was really no feasible alternative to the establishment of ANAHL. 
Alternatives to ANAHL performing particular functions were only presented 
at the PWC Inquiry to demonstrate the inadequacies of these 
alternatives. 
Wynne claims that the evaluation of a single technology without 
consideration of viable alternatives is a feature of most technology 
assessment. In this way, Wynne argues, the "more overtly political 
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question of relative benefits" is avoided. 
The submissions to the PWC did not present alternatives for 
assessment but instead advocated a particular technology. The 
institutions concerned had defined their goals and these goals reflected 
their perception of needs and their commitments. The PWC was required 
to either reject the proposal, an unlikely outcome in view of the prior 
government approval and commitment, or approve it; they were not 
expected to assess or suggest alternatives. 
The only alternative presented to the PWC, to ANAHL performing 
* 
diagnosis, was to rely on Pirbright, and a variety of arguments were used 
to demonstrate that this was unsatisfactory. Similarly it was argued 
that Pirbright was the only possible source of vaccine and again this 
was claimed to be unsatisfactory. The limitations and problems 
associated with relying on overseas laboratories or overseas outbreaks 
* 
for training purposes were also pointed out. 
In fact it would appear that the arguments advocating that ANAHL 
perform these functions were presented in such a way as to 
overwhelmingly suggest that there was no viable alternative to ANAHL. 
The ASTEC Inquiry, undertaken on their own initiative, did consider 
alternatives and recommended that Australia establish "a small ANAHL 
research group within an overseas animal health laboratory which has 
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access to live FMD virus". This group would undertake research and 
prepare and test diagnostic reagents as well as assist in diagnosis 
should the need arise. The ASTEC Committee also claimed that they were 
not convinced that Australia needed to produce vaccine, stating that it 
had "not been demonstrated that adequate supplies could not be obtained, 
or made under contract, overseas sand to standards of potency and 180 
safety acceptable to Australian authorities." They also recommended 
that training be carried out overseas, "paying for the use of overseas 
facilities" if need be. 
The ASTEC recommendations and conclusions highlighted some of the 
foregone choices concealed in the submissions to the PWC. The PWC 
Committee were dependent on the institutions committed to the 
establishment of ANAHL for expert advice and these experts were not 
promoting alternatives. So not only was a consideration of alternatives 
outside the PWC'S terms of reference, but also outside their ffeld of 
competence given that the problem had already been defined as 
scientific. 
Counter Arguments 
From the previous detailed examination of the arguments used to 
justify the individual functions of ANAHL, it can be seen that often it 
was not the opponents who provided the counter arguments to the 
justifications but the proponents themselves. 
On the question of training, Mr Gee claimed that participation in 
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major exotic disease outbreaks was the best training whereas the CSIRO 
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Ferguson Report claimed this argument was invalid. The disadvantages 
Mr Gee saw in participation in overseas outbreaks was that it was 
restricted to just a few people, however the CSIRO saw cost, the limited 
disease range and the danger of bringing back the disease as the 
disadvantages. Dr Snowdon saw training in overseas laboratories as 
the only alternative to training at ANAHL, but he claimed that this 
reliance on overseas laboratories was unsatisfactory because of the 185 
cost and the sinall numbers who could attend. 
That improved training methods were required was not in dispute, 
even by the opponents of training at ANAHL. What was disputed was the 
best way to achieve this training, and on this question there would 
appear to be as much disagreement among proponents as between proponents 
and opponents. 
The arguments presented by the CSIRO justifying endemic disease • 
research were effectively countered by their later decision to eliminate 
endemic disease research with no more explanation than it was . 
unjustified. 
There were several contradictions with regard to the arguments for 
vaccine production. It was claimed that stockpiling was unsatisfactory 
and impractical, yet it was indicated later that ANAHL would be engaged 
in stockpiling, and that Britain and USA were both stockpiling vaccines. 
The CSIRO argued that other countries may not be prepared to manufacture 
vaccines because of the risk associated with the process, if it involved 
a type of virus not naturally experienced by them. However the CSIRO 
was advocating that ANAHL produce a wide range of vaccines for 
stockpiling despite Australia being free from the disease altogether. 
It was claimed following a review of policy in 1979, that it was 
now accepted that vaccination might be used as part of an eradication 
campaign in Australia because of new methods of control and improvements 
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in vaccines. This would suggest that the original proposal to 
establish a vaccine production unit in 1964 and again in 1970 was 
unjustified. 
The CSIRO claimed that Pirbright would be unable to perform follow-
up testing and then extended this to suggest that Pirbright was 
unsuitable and unreliable for performing initial diagnosis. However, 
elsewhere the CSIRO stated that Pirbright, as a world reference centre, 
was committed to establishing an initial diagnosis. 
The claim that a diagnostic laboratory would result in faster 
diagnosis and hence earlier control is contradicted by the CSIRO 
evidence that a slaughter-out programme would be undertaken on the basis 
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of clinical symptoms alone without waiting for laboratory confirmation. 
A major argument used by the CSIRO at the PWC Inquiry justifying 
the establishment of ANAHL was the increasing risk of the introduction 
of exotic diseases into Australia, however Mr Gee's evidence at the PWC 
conflicted with this view. Mr Gee claimed at that time that he did not 
believe there was an "extremely high risk of the introduction of FMD" 
and that he was satisfied that the Quarantine Department could 
"effectively maintain [its] existing quarantine s e c u r i t y . a l s o 
stated that the greatest risk would come from importing livestock from 
disease infected countriesi^°However by 1982 Mr Gee had apparently 
altered his assessment and now claimed that "quarantine could no longer 
completely protect Australia"^^^and that there was no "real risk or any 
high risk at all of FMD being introduced into Australia with live 
animals".^^^ 
Mazur maintains that disputes between experts indicate that 
interpretations and value judgements play a significant part in 
"scientific" evidence.^^^ When these disputes occur between opponents 
and proponents, the differences tend to be ascribed to basic differences 
in values and definitions of social need. However contradictions and 
counter-arguments among proponents would suggest a more explicit 
political dimension, and the use of a particular argument at a particular 
time could be ascribed to political expediency. 
* * * * * 
The changes in arguments, the shifts, the unwarranted extensions 
and the contradictions all suggest that facts alone do not determine the 
basis for decision-making. Thus it would appear that value-judgments 
and political considerations play an important role both in the 
informational and decision-making aspects of technology assessment. 
i 
The power of experts, through their access to specialised 
knowledge, allows them to define arguments as scientific and often to 
define their expertise. In this way important decisions of problem 
definition, data selection, collection and assessment have already been 
made before the formal assessment procedure. 
By defining decision-making as scientific and technology assessment 
as fact-finding, the political nature of decisions and value-judgements 
and uncertainties are concealed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE SELECTION OF THE SITE 
THE SELECTION OF THE SITE 
The PWC conclusion that the site selected was suitable gives no 
indication of the concern shown by some members of the PWC about the 
choice of the Geelong Rifle Range site. One of the reasons for their 
concern was the apparent reversal of an earlier decision. The 
CSIRO Report of May 1973 stated: "it is recommended that Geelong should 
not be selected for the location of the National Animal Health 
* 
Laboratory in preference to any of the sites recommended in 
Melbourne, Canberra, Brisbane or Sydney"^ and "the four capital city 
sites are considered superior to the island sites, Geelong or country 
sites. This decision was arrived at after examining all of the scientific 
and technical factors likely to affect the microbiological security and 
efficient functioning of the laboratory and it is believed that these 
factors should override all other considerations in influencing the 
2 
choice of site." 
However, by September 1974, Geelong was promoted as being the most 
suitable site for ANAHL. 
In its report of August 1972, the PET concluded that the ideal site 
for an animal health laboratory should be: 
about 25 to 30 acres in extent and preferably of similar dimensions 
in both directions 
located on ground with sound load bearing qualities for building 
structural purposes 
accessible to all major urban services such as power, water, 
sewerage and gas 
remote from susceptible livestock (cattle, sheep, pigs and goats) 
by half a mile, preferably one mile. This would mean being remote 
not only from farms but also from racecourses, showgrounds, 
abattoirs and saleyards 
within reasonable distance of a major university containing well 
established departments of microbiology and biochemistry. There 
would also be some advantage in being close to a university with a 
veterinary school 
within reasonable distance of other tertiary education 
establishments, such as a major technical college 
within a city containing a major airport to ensure rapid transport 
of specimens and materials should an outbreak of an exotic disease 
occur in a part of the country remote from the laboratory 
within a reasonable distance of residential areas 
It was also considered preferable that the Laboratory be located as 
close as possible to the centre of gravity of the Australian livestock 
industry and to the mainstream of primary industry research in 
Australia. ^ 
The Cabinet Submission of October 1972 made no reference to possible 
sites for the Laboratory, but Cabinet noted the view that consideration 
might be given to a site in a country centre. The PET reexamined the 
situation but reiterated its original conclusion that there were severe 
disadvantages and no particular advantage in such a decision. 
In order to locate a site which fulfilled the requirements of the 
PET Report, the CSIRO and the Commonwealth Department of Works, with the 
assistance of other departments and authorities, carried out an 
extensive investigation which looked at eight sites in both New South 
Wales and Victoria, five in Queensland, including two island sites, four 
in the Australian Capital Territory, and a possible site at Geelong. 
The conclusions reached by this team were that the four capital city 
sites identified by them were superior to the island sites, Geelong or 
country sites.^ 
As well as having the general disadvantages of country or regional 
centres identified by PET, ̂  Geelong did not meet the specific 
requirements of isolation from susceptible livestock, community pf 
interest associations and proximity to an international standard 
airport. 
Meanwhile, in December 1972, the Director of the Geelong Regional 
Planning Authority and the Executive Chairman of the Geelong Promotion 
Committee made representations to the Victorian Premier and his Deputy 
to put the case that Geelong, and the state as a whole, would benefit if 
ANAHL was established in Geelong: "It was put to the Premier that 
Geelong's selection as a site for the laboratory would be greatly 
enhanced if the fourth University of Victoria was to be located in the 
Geelong Region."^ In 1973 the Geelong Region was selected as the site 
for Victoria's fourth University. 
In June 1973, the CSIRO's Proposal for a National Animal Health 
Laboratory, document of May 1973 was considered by the Ministers for 
Science, Primary Industry, Health and Northern Development. They agreed 
to support the proposal but requested that the final choice of a site be 
made by the Minister for Urban and Regional Development.® In August 
1973 Geelong was designated as a regional growth centre. In its sub-
mission to the PWC, the Geelong Regional Planning Authority stated: 
"This decision [i.e., the decision in August that Geelong be designated 
a regional growth centre] led to Geelong being re-examined as a possible 
site for the Laboratory, and in fact, meetings with the Director of the 
Geelong Regional Planning Authority reopened in June 1973." ^ 
This meant that only a month after the CSIRO Report recommending 
against the selection of Geelong, meetings were being held with the 
Geelong Regional Planning Authority. Within three months of the CSIRO 
Report, Geelong had been selected as the site for the fourth Victorian 
University and had been designated a regional growth centre. 
Ten possible sites were located in Geelong but the initial 
inspection of the Rifle Range site in June 1973 "suggested that the site 
would not be appropriate because of hydraulic and structural 
10 
difficulties". The Geelong Regional Planning Authority submission goes 
on to say that: "The GRPA, whilst anxious to see the Laboratory 
established in the Geelong Region, did not put the Rifle Range forward 
for investigation at an early date because it was aware of the limited 
amount of Corio Bay Foreshore currently or potentially available for 
community recreation. However, because no other alternative location 
seemed to be possible in Geelong, the selection of the Rifle Range as 
the site for the ANAHL has the unanimous support of the Authority." ^^ 
Once the Rifle Range site at Geelong had been identified, the CSIRO 
and the Department of Works undertook an environmental impact study and 
produced their report in October 1973. This report along with the joint 
submission from the Ministers for Science, Health, Primary Industry and 
Northern Development, formed the basis of the Government's decision in 
April 1974 to build the Laboratory at Geelong on the Rifle Range site. 
It would seem that between May 1973, when the CSIRO published its 
report recommending against Geelong, and October 1973, when the National 
Animal Health Laboratory Environmental Impact Study was published, a 
number of important and significant actions were taken which resulted in 
Geelong being selected. 
In the CSIRO submission to the PWC it states that Geelong did not 
meet the PET requirements, "as to isolation from susceptible livestock 
12 
and this was regarded by the working group as a severe disability", yet 
the 1973 CSIRO Report also listed Geelong as not meeting the ' 
requirements of proximity to an international airport and community of 
interest associations. The PET Report considered that a livestock free 13 
zone around the Laboratory was not essential to its security and in fact 
designed ANAHL so that microbiological security would not be dependent 
upon its location, but it did stress the importance of it being close to 14 
a major airport for the rapid transportation of specimens. 
Mr Bonnett (PWC Member) began the questioning of the site decision 
with the statement: "I am not happy with the determination of the site."^^ 
He pointed out that the four sites in the major cities were recommended 
ahead of Geelong and that Geelong had no university, a requirement of 
the PET recommendations. He stated: "While the site is reserved for a 
university, it is only probable that one will be built in the near 
future."^^He continued: 
"I am sure there are suitable sites in other centres, 
too, that are about the same driving time away from a 
major airport where there are established univers-
ities. I want to know what makes the Geelong site 
more desirable than those sites in other centres, 
especially when we figure that our heavily populated 
stock area and our major export stock area is north 
of the Tropic of Capricorn, for instance. I would 
like to know what makes the Geelong site more desir-
able. We have not had this comparison given to us at 
any stage of the game in any of the evidence. 
Senator Jessop continued this line of questioning: "Yesterday Mr 
Bonnett asked, 'Are you [i.e. the CSIRO] happy with the site?' and I 
think you said, 'I think it is satisfactory.' Does that really mean that 
you are hysterical about it?" Dr Allen (CSIRO) replied: "I just think 
that it means that it is a satisfactory site. It does not go beyond 
18 
that." Senator Jessop also stated: "It appeared to me to be an 
afterthought that Geelong was included." ̂ ^ 
i 
Mr Keogh then joined in; he stated "In spite of the extensive 
nature of the questioning from Mr Bonnett and others, I am still 
persuaded that CSIRO is not completely and absolutely satisfied that 
20 
this is the best site." Mr Keogh also pointed out that Geelong lacked a 
major airpor^^ and a university with a veterinary school. ̂ ^ 
Senator Poyser asked: "Of all the sites considered is Geelong the 
site that will create the least inconvenience to residential areas?"^^ 
However Dr Allen claimed that it was impossible to answer that in 
absolute terms. 
Dr Allen had previously suggested that Geelong had the advantage of 
being a Commonwealth property, which would mean that delays and 
24 
complications could be avoided. In answer to Senator Poyser's question 
Dr Allen admitted that the site in Melbourne and the one in Brisbane 
were also owned by the Commonwealth, and that neither of these involved 
25 
the demolition of any property. 
Dr Allen of the CSIRO gave extensive answers, covering several pages 
of evidence, to most of the questions on siting. However these answers 
were repetitious and concentrated on the history of the decision and not 
on the reason for the decision. He stated: "To sum up, I cannot answer 
explicitly your question as to why the four Ministers decided that the 
Laboratory had to be part of the region's growth centre. Nor can I 
provide you with information as to what decided the Cities Commission to 
recommend Geelong. We were the recipients of both of those pieces of 
advice under Ministerial direction." ^^ 
Mr McVeigh (PWC Member) asked twice for a resume of the discussions 
between the CSIRO and the Cities Commission,^^ but was told by the 
Chairman of the PWC that it was "a matter the Committee will take up at 
a later stage". 
It would appear that at least some members of the PWC were not 
satisfied with the selection of Geelong Rifle Range site. However the 
conclusion that it was a suitable site was reached despite their 
reservations and criticisms. The Committee was not provided with full 
information on how or why Geelong was selected, nor were they given the 
choice of an al ternative. si te. The terms of the inquiry would appear 
to be such that an approval of the establishment of ANAHL implied the 
automatic approval of the site and no provision was made for the 
rejection of the Geelong site. 
It could be concluded that the PWC Inquiry, rather than 
investigating the suitability of the site, applied a stamp of legitimacy 
to decisions made elsewhere. 
A CSIRO publication Questions and Answers (undated) stated "the 
suitability of the Rifle Range site and the possible environmental 
effects of ANAHL was scrutinised at a public inquiry undertaken in 
Geelong in September 1974 by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Public Works. That committee concluded ... that the Rifle Range site 
was suitable." This brochure also claimed: "Geelong was chosen for the 
Australian National Animal Health Laboratory because the site - the old 
Geelong Rifle Range - is the best in Australia. The site was selected 
ahead of about forty others looked at all over Australia and after 
consideration of an exhaustive environmental impact statement."^^ This 
claim, that Geelong was selected because it was "the best site in 
Australia" would seem to be an unsupported extension of the PWC con-
clusion that the site was "suitable". 
The PET Report identified a number of requirements that were 
considered necessary for the site of ANAHL. On the basis of these 
criteria, Geelong was not judged the most suitable site and in fact 
specific disadvantages were identified. The selection of Geelong would 
appear to have been based on considerations other than scientific ones, 
and although the PWC appeared to recognise this, they did not question 
its legitimacy. Indeed it could be argued that the scientific evidence 
submitted supporting Geelong was used to conceal the political nature of 
the decision. 
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The PWC Inquiry stands out as a central feature in the history of 
the establishment of ANAHL. It was depicted as an extensive 
investigation and assessment of the proposal to establish ANAHL, and the 
conclusions and recommendations contained in the PWC Report became 
authoritative statements and were used as justifications for later 
decisions. 
However an examination of the decision-making process would'suggest 
that the need for ANAHL had been established well before the PWC 
Inquiry, and that the purpose of the inquiry was to legitimate this 
decision rather than assess the technology. 
Conrad points out that assessments of technology generally perform 
a legitimating function ^ and Wynne adds that past commitments and ' 
values influence the present values and assessments. Thus it becomes 
important to look, not only at decision making by the PWC, but to 
consider the investigations and decisions which led to this inquiry. 
The AAC in 1970, on the basis of the CSVC and IDC Reports, had 
agreed that a need for ANAHL existed, and subsequent investigations 
concentrated on the feasibility of establishing a maximum security 
animal health laboratory, the functions it should perform and where it 
should be situated. By 1972 the Commonwealth Government had agreed in 
principle to the establishment of ANAHL and recommended that $200,000 be 
made available to complete design specifications. Five months prior to 
the PWC Inquiry the Government approved the establishment of ANAHL on 
the Geelong Rifle Range site, agreed to the formation of a Consultative 
Committee to assist in the management of ANAHL, approved documentation 
of the project by the Department of Housing and Construction, and noted 
that the recurrent costs would be additional to the CSIRO's budget 
requirements. 
So the major decisions would appear to have been made prior to the 
PWC Inquiry. However, the establishment of ANAHL was not a neutral or 
inevitable decision, but an outcome of particular choices. And these 
choices had been made by institutions committed to the establishment of 
ANAHL. It was the advocates of ANAHL who defined the decision making 
problem, as well as gathered, selected and evaluated the evidence. 
This control over information can be used to influence or 
predetermine decisions^ and Wynne points out that technical 
intelligence is "also political intelligence to the (often very large) 
extent that it 
a) influences the allocation of resources and benefits and costs 
between different social sectors an interests, and 
b) legitimates the power of institutions and interests of various 
sorts."^ 
Control over knowledge also allows these groups to define the 
decision making as scientific and thereby increases their control since 
governments come to rely on their expertise. 
The fact that the CSVC and IDC made similar recommendations gave 
added credence and authority to both. That the PET Report took two years 
to prepare, included visits to overseas laboratories, was obviously 
costly and required six volumes to contain its findings, added to the 
authority of its recommendations and reduced the chance of these being 
challenged. So each report lent its authority to a subsequent report 
and as a result made it more difficult to challenge the original basis 
for the decision. Thus the number of investigations and reports and the 
large commitments in terms of time and money, would appear to have a 
cumulative effect on the authority of the decision reached. 
The initiative to establish ANAHL did not cone from the government; 
both the need and the means of fulfilling that need were defined by the 
CSYC, the IDC, the AAC and the PET. As a result the reports from these 
groups became vehicles of advocacy rather than assessment. However none 
i 
of these groups presented evidence at the PWC Inquiry although their 
recommendations were used as part of the CSIRO submission. It would 
seem that the CSIRO had taken on the role of these groups, becoming both 
expert and advocate. 
As discussed previously, there appeared to be a discrepancy between 
the role the CSIRO said it played with regard to decision making, and 
the role it actually played. Although claiming to be merely 
administrators and operators of ANAHL, it would seeni that the CSIRO had 
been involved in early decision making through its membership of various 
committees, and continued to make decisions about the proposed 
functions, the site and the design of ANAHL. But as well as this, there 
would appear to be a discrepancy between the expe'^tise claimed by the 
CSIRO and its actual expertise. Some of their arguments relied on the 
authority of these earlier reports, but they also held themselves out as 
experts in areas of quarantine, economics and risK and safety 
assessment. The PWC accepted the CSIRO arguTr;ents about the risk of an 
exotic disease entering Australia rather than the Quarantine 
Department's assessment; they accepted their argirments that the various 
functions could provide economic advantages, and that the site was 
suitable and the microbiological security was adequate. Thus it would 
appear that the CSIRO had defined a wide range of areas "scientific" and 
had defined themselves as experts in these areas and these definitions 
were accepted by the PWC without question. 
No alternative to the establishment of a maximum security animal 
health laboratory was considered in the reports prior to the PWC and the 
evidence submitted to the PWC was presented in such a way as to suggest 
that there was no feasible alternative to ANAHL. In this way tf choice 
between alternatives, and the political and value judgements that this 
implied, was avoided. 
ANAHL was proposed as a means of protecting Australia's livestock 
industry in the event of an outbreak of exotic disease, and Collingridge 
claims that when goals are stated imprecisely it becomes difficult.to 
criticise the proposed means of achieving these goals and show that this 
may not be the most effective way of realising the objective.^ Not 
until the recent controversies, was the establishment of ANAHL 
criticised and alternatives put forward. 
In the arguments justifying the proposed functions of ANAHL, 
alternatives were given, but only to highlight their inadequacies. The 
PWC were told that Pirbright may be unreliable for primary diagnosis and 
would be unable to perform the necessary follow-up testing after an 
outbreak was confirmed. It was also claimed that Pirbright was the only 
safe source of vaccine but that there were many drawbacks in relying on 
this source. Although current training involved attendance at overseas 
courses and outbreaks, this was said to be unsatisfactory because of the 
limited numbers who could attend and the cost involved. So the PWC were 
not given any real alternatives to ANAHL performing the various 
functions. The submissions suggested that all alternatives had been 
investigated but rejected as unsuitable, and this was accepted by the 
PWC. 
As well as arguing that ANAHL was the only way these ftinctions 
could be effectively undertaken, the proponents also argued that these 
functions would provide an on-going function for ANAHL between outbreak 
situations and would result in economic advantages. 
i 
The arguments promoting the various functions were presented as 
"scientific" arguments, however no experts outside those committed to 
the establishment of ANAHL were involved in presenting or assessing the 
evidence. Thus it could be argued that evidence was selected to support 
a particular commitment. Furthermore, the changes in arguments, the 
unwarranted extensions of arguments and the contradictions would suggest 
that political factors played an important part in the evidence selected 
and presented as well as in the assessment of the evidence. 
As well as reflecting the perceptions and values of the proponents, 
the arguments used to justify the proposed functions also reflected the 
prevailing social attitudes. The need for ANAHL was initially 
established purely for coping with an outbreak situation. During the 
period when government approval was sought, further justifications were 
added to demonstrate ANAHL's viability and usefulness both during and 
outside an outbreak. Questioning of the functions did not begin until 
after building had commenced and at this stage the arguments appeared 
to shift towards convincing the primary producers that economic 
advantages would result from the operation of ANAHL even without an 
outbreak. 
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The justifications for ANAHL were presented to the PWC as factual 
and objective evidence and accepted as such, and the man/value 
judgements, uncertainties and assumptions were overlooked or concealed. 
The arguments of need relied heavily on the assertion that there 
was an increasing risk of an outbreak of an exotic disease. However the 
perception of risk and the assessment of the degree of risk are not 
objective "scientific" activities, but depend on interpretations and 
val ue judgements. Although this was demonstrated by Mr Gee's evidence 
which conflicted with the CSIRO's argument of the increasing danger of 
an outbreak, it was overlooked by the PWC. 
Thus it can be seen that both the informational and decision making 
aspects of technology assessment are value laden. The CSIRO and the 
Quarantine Department gave different interpretations of the risks of an 
outbreak, which would appear to reflect their commitments. This would 
seem to be substantiated by the change in Mr Gee's assessment of risk 
when he no longer represented the Quarantine Department. 
The PWC on the other hand selected the information it considered 
relevent. The selection of the CSIRO's evidence over the contradictory 
claims of the Quarantine Department would appear to substantiate the 
claim that the function of the PWC was to legitimate the decision that a 
need for ANAHL existed. 
The selection of the Geelong Rifle Range site had already been 
approved by the Government in April 1974 and so again it could be argued 
that the function of the PWC was to legitimate a decision that had 
already been made. 
The arguments supporting the Geelong site were presented as the 
results of extensive scientific investigations. However the extensive 
scientific investigations had one year earlier recommended that Geelong 
should not be selected. In this case it was not new scientific evidence 
and information that became available that altered this recommendation, 
but direct political intervention. Although Dr Allen of the CSIRO 
initially tried to justify the choice of Geelong on scientific grounds, ' 
with continued questioning he admitted that it was a political decision, 
and one which he claimed the CSIRO was not a party to. ; 
It would seem that once the decision was made, scientific 
justifications were developed to conceal the political nature of the 
choice. Although the PWC was aware of the discrepancies In the 
evidence, it was unwilling or unable to reject the choice of Geelong. 
Again no viable alternative was presented for consideration, and, given 
that the selection of Geelong was made at a Ministerial level and that 
the Government had already approved this, the PWC appeared to have no 
alternative but to agree that the site was suitable. 
Throughout all the arguments justifying the need for ANAHL and the 
need to perform its proposed functions, was the suggestion of the 
economic advantages that would result. However the BAE cost benefit 
study, which was prepared for the PWC Inquiry, provided the first and 
only formal study of the economic viability of ANAHL. On the basis of 
this study the PWC concluded that ANAHL was economically justified. 
However an examination of this study revealed that it was based on 
questionable assumptions, used questionable methods of calculation and 
examples and contained a high degree of uncertainty. 
The uncertainties and value judgements contained in the study were 
overlooked. As Wynne has noted. 
"expertise and authority can be 'negotiated' by 
controlling information about uncertainties or 
conflicting points of view and even by outlawing 
critical questions and pretending that decisions are 
based upon sophisticated technical forecasting and 
similar calculations, as opposed to structurally 
'given' presumptions and guesswork." ̂  
Furthermore an examination of the Minutes of Evidence revealed that 
the PWC did not investigate or assess the report itself but accepted its 
validity on the basis of the credibility and reputation of the 
institution who prepared the report. The claim that ANAHL was econom-
ically justified became an authoritative statement which was not 
challenged. 
Technology assessment, by the very nature of technology, involves 
dealing with uncertainty, since the full "factual" consequences cannot 
be known. Added to this, technology assessment has been defined as' 
scientific, thus experts are relied upon to present and evaluate the 
arguments. Wynne argues that the increasing complexity and scientific 
nature of technology and the inevitable unforeseeable consequences have 
resulted in the assessment of the institutions which appear to control 
the technology.^ If decision-makers and the general public are unable 
to evaluate the technology itself, then the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the decision-making processes and institutions is 
evaluated instead: "Questions of public trust, credibility, openness 
and significantly, the past track record in these respects, become the 
8 
key factors in framing social attitudes." Wynne claims that this is 
"perhaps the major component of the social assessment of technology, 
putting into very minor perspective the fact-finding model of such 9 
decisions." 
Although the proposals to establish ANAHL involved a joint 
submission by the Department of the Health, the Department of Primary 
Industry and the CSIRO, the CSIRO emerged as the responsible 
institution. The arguments put forward by the CSIRO were continually 
justified on scientific grounds and the uncertainties and value-
judgements concealed. Furthermore it has been argued here that the PWC 
provided little more than a ritual legitimation of decisions made by the 
institutions committed to the establishment of ANAHL. ' 
An examination of the decision-making involved in the establishment 
of ANAHL would appear to verify Wynne's claim that: "expertise and 
authority can be 'negotiated' by concealing uncertainties and value 
judgements and by claiming that decisions are based on objective 
scientific evidence." Although this situation may facilitate 
decision-making in the short term, Wynne maintains that eventually it is 
counter productive when the falsification is revealed: "attempts to 
gain authority on specific decisions and issues by using spurious images 
of certainty, gives rise to a greater and more general loss of authority 
by the institutions as a whole when that image is eventually punctured, 
as they nearly always are."^^ 
A recent article in The Bulletin claimed that "the CSIRO has been 
transformed from a great Australian institution into the subject of 
sometimes strong criticism" and that "the CSIRO has blown its scientific 
infallibility". ^^ Barry Jones stated in Parliament that "the CSIRO is 
in a position of great embarrassment about the future of ANAHL. 
These statements would suggest that the CSIRO has lost some of its 
authority and credibility as a result of the controversy surrounding the 
establishment of ANAHL. 
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